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ABSTRACT: The paper aims at positioning two branches of 
the 20th century’s non-representationalist paradigms of 
thought, namely, pragmatic naturalism and 
philosophical hermeneutics, by discussing the pertaining 
views of John Dewey and Justus Buchler, and in turn, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger. The first 
section examines Dewey’s views on practice, cognition, 
and truth, and in turn, Buchler’s theory of judgment as 
an attempt at improving on Dewey’s theory of 
experience. Since it is primarily Buchler’s approach that 
shows considerable affinity to that of Gadamer, the 
second section proceeds by comparing their respective 
views on scientific inquiry and art. In order to map in 
more depth the similarities and differences between their 
approaches, a short historical genealogy of their versions 
of non-representationalism follows, as well as a 
discussion of the two pivotal points of such a genealogy, 
namely, Heidegger’s idea of ontological difference and 
the Buchlerian notion of nature. These considerations 
lead to different conceptions of spatio-temporal relations 
as well as to different senses of the notion of “event.” For 
that reason, the third section begins with a short 
discussion of a specific linguistic phenomenon, namely, 
the middle voice, by means of which some basic features 
of hermeneutic philosophy pertaining to the mentioned 
notions are to be highlighted. The paper concludes with 
summing up the common and different traits of 
pragmatic naturalism and philosophical hermeneutics, 
especially with respect to the issues of truth, justification, 
event, and interpretation. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this paper I consider two trends within a more 
comprehensive orientation in the Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental philosophical movements of the 19th and 
20th centuries. Namely, I concentrate on two branches of 
what I call here non-representationalist paradigms of 
thought, namely, on pragmatic naturalism, and 
philosophical hermeneutics. In particular, I discuss the 
views of several representatives of these schools, those 
                                                 
1 This work was carried out within the frames of the 
MTA-ELTE Hermeneutic Research Group supported by 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.   
of John Dewey, Justus Buchler, and in turn, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, and Martin Heidegger. My aim is to position 
their approaches in the light of one another, and that 
can be done most readily along the issues of art, truth, 
and event.   
 
This way of posing my topic has been inspired by John 
Ryder’s recently published volume (2013) titled The 
Things in Heaven and Earth: An Essay in Pragmatic 
Naturalism. In this book Ryder develops the 
comprehensive idea as well as the metaphysical and 
epistemological implications of a contemporary version 
of pragmafc naturalism―a philosophical stance that 
reconciles, among others, pragmatist constructivism 
with naturalist objecfvism―and he also demonstrates 
the explanatory power and fruitfulness of such an 
approach when applied to issues pertaining to “social 
experience,” namely, topics related to democracy, 
national and international politics, and education. 
Although Ryder explicates the proposed pragmatic 
naturalist standpoint mostly by referring to more or less 
contemporary issues and debates in philosophy, his 
endeavor is primarily informed by the views of two 
major representatives of The Columbia School 
Naturalism.2 It is Justus Buchler’s metaphysics of natural 
complexes and his thoroughly relational notion of nature 
that inspire most the metaphysical and epistemological 
sides of the version of pragmatist naturalism Ryder 
advocates, and it is John Dewey’s thick conception of 
democracy that guides―beside the epistemological 
insights gained from Buchlerian naturalism―the 
author’s approach to diverse aspects of social 
experience.    
 
Nevertheless, the views of these two major philosophical 
heroes of Ryder’s volume clash on one point with one 
another according to the author’s presentation, and that 
point concerns above all the cognitive import of art, and 
by implication the issue of truth as event – two topics 
                                                 
2 The four major figures of Columbia School Naturalism 
were Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, John Dewey, John 
Herman Randall, Jr., and Justus Buchler.  
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which, in turn, pertain to the very heart of the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
namely, to the ontology of art developed in Truth and 
Method. Dewey figures here as having much more 
comprehensive notions of knowledge, truth, and human 
interaction with the world in general, than those 
addressed in most of the more recent―or, for that 
maher, more tradifonal―epistemologies, nofons broad 
enough for comprehending the whole spectrum of 
human experience. Yet, Ryder also points to several 
aspects of his thought which are less satisfactory, 
especially when at stake is that truth which artworks are 
able to convey. In turn, Buchler is presented as having 
developed a theory of judgment which successfully 
improves on Dewey’s conception of experience, in such 
a way that it is able to do justice to the cognitive 
dimension of art, among others. Although in his 
discussion of the issue of art and knowledge the author 
does not refer to Gadamer and his ontology of art, it is 
striking just in how many important respects the views 
he presents―following Buchler―converge with those of 
Gadamer, although the remaining crucial differences are 
not to be overlooked, either.  
 
Thus, one of my primary interests in this paper is to map, 
compare, confront with one another, and position the 
main features of these approaches, in particular the 
various ways they conceive the basic manner in which 
humans comport themselves toward their external 
world, and thereby achieve meaning in their life. This 
concerns first and foremost an issue regarding to which 
one can observe a clear affinity between the overall 
philosophical outlooks of the investigated approaches, 
indeed, a common feature of pragmatism in general, and 
philosophical hermeneutics. Namely, both attempt to 
overcome the traditional representationalist paradigms 
of conceiving the basic nature of the relation between 
humans and their environing world. As opposed to the 
strict line, of Cartesian origin, drawn between the 
subject and its objecfve world―which is to be bridged 
again via methodological means―both of these 
philosophical trends entertain a more elementary and 
much more comprehensive idea of how humans relate 
to the world. Such a non-representationalist orientation 
is carried out in both camps by appealing to the primacy 
of―although diversely conceived, nevertheless basic 
nofons of―pracfce, over against the tradifonal 
representationalist privileging of methodologically 
secured theoretical world-comportment. Thereby they 
are also compelled to offer newly construed accounts of 
knowledge and truth, as in fact they do.  
 
All these appoint the main issues I’ll concentrate on. 
First I examine one-by-one the pertaining views of the 
two discussed representatives of The Columbia School 
Naturalism, namely, Dewey and Buchler. Here I’ll 
address in particular their respective conceptions of 
interaction, cognition, and truth, all of them obviously 
being informed by their respective notions of practice. 
Since it is primarily Buchler’s approach that shows 
considerable affinity to that of Gadamer, I proceed by 
sketching and comparing their respective views on 
scientific inquiry and art. Furthermore, in order to map 
in more depth the similarities and differences between 
the mentioned two versions of pragmatic naturalism, on 
the one hand, and the hermeneutic philosophies of 
Heidegger and Gadamer, on the other, I offer a short 
historical genealogy of their non-representationalist 
paradigms of thought. Having done so, I concentrate on 
the two pivotal points on which these philosophical 
stances seem to converge with, and at the same time 
diverge from, one another, namely, on the pragmatist 
notion of nature, and in turn, on the fundamental 
Heideggerian concept―followed also by Gadamer―of 
the so called ontological difference. Since the pertaining 
considerations will lead us to different conceptions of 
spatio-temporal relations as well as to some sense of the 
notion of “event”, as a next step I insert a short 
discussion of a specific linguistic phenomenon, namely, 
the middle voice, by means of which some basic features 
of hermeneutic philosophy pertaining to the mentioned 
notions, and thereby its specificity within the non-
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representationalist paradigms, are to be highlighted. 
Finally, I conclude by focusing on and summing up the 
common and different traits of pragmatic naturalism and 
philosophical hermeneutics, especially with respect to 
the rather epistemological issues implied by them.   
 
The structure of the paper is the following, accordingly:  
 
I. Introduction 
II. The Pragmatic Naturalism of Dewey and Buchler  
II.1. Dewey on Practice, Cognition, and Truth  
II.2. Buchler’s Theory of Judgment. An Attempt at 
Improving Dewey’s Theory of Experience  
III. Positioning Pragmatic Naturalism and Philosophical 
Hermeneutics 
III.1. Positioning Buchlerian Naturalism and 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics along the Issues of 
Scientific Inquiry and Art 
III.2. Overcoming Modern Subjectivism. A 
Genealogy of the Discussed Non-
representationalist Paradigms of Thought   
III.3. Heidegger’s Idea of Ontological Difference 
and the Buchlerian Notion of Nature 
IV. Truth and Event  
IV.1. Medial Events, Middle Voice, and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics  
IV.2. Epistemological Consequences. Truth, 
Justification, Event, Interpretation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. The Pragmatic Naturalism of Dewey and Buchler 
 
II.1. Dewey on Practice, Cognition, and Truth  
 
As it is well known, Dewey’s pragmatism departs from 
the long-standing Western tradition of privileging theory 
over against practice, and he does so by developing a 
non-dualistic account of experience, and of nature as it is 
experienced. His departure concerned both basic 
historical forms of privileging theory, namely, the high 
esteem for the theoretical way of life (originating in 
ancient Greece), and the modern representationalist 
view of the relation between cognition and world 
(originating primarily from Descartes). As an illustration 
of Dewey’s non-representationalist agenda I quote only 
one short passage, from 1908:     
 
“The issue is no longer an ideally necessary but 
actually impossible copying, versus an improper 
but unavoidable modification of reality through 
organic inhibitions and stimulations, but it is the 
right, the economical, the effective, … the useful 
and satisfactory reaction versus the wasteful, the 
enslaving, the misleading, and the confusing 
reaction” (Dewey 1908a, 134).  
 
This orientation entails a shift away from the primacy of 
theory within the theory-practice opposition, to the 
alternative between good or less satisfactory actions and 
reactions. By this move theory becomes understood as a 
particular practice, namely, a tool in the service of action 
within an overall primacy of practice.  
 
The primacy of practice has been foreshadowed in the 
history of philosophy at least from Kant’s so called 
anthropological turn onward, who discerned the real 
role of reason in its being constitutive of morality, rather 
than cognition. In fact, such a primacy became a 
recurring topic in the form, e.g., of Fichte’s concept of “I” 
in which being and acting overlap one another; or in the 
views of Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, 
according to which being is ultimately willing; or in Marx 
notion of production, etc. It is peculiar to Dewey’s 
metaphysics, however, that practice for him is to be 
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understood as “the practical machinery for bringing 
about adaptation of the environment to the life 
requirements of the organism” (ibid., 133), in short, as 
the functioning of organic human life. In such a context, 
everything receives its determination through the 
function it has, namely, the role it plays in the overall 
operation of the human organism.   
  
Accordingly, cognition for Dewey is itself an organic 
process, fully derivative of practice: 
 
“[…] the appropriate subject-matter of 
awareness [i.e., cognition] is not reality at large, 
a metaphysical heaven to be mimeographed at 
many removes upon a badly constructed mental 
carbon paper which yields at best only 
fragmentary, blurred, and erroneous copies. Its 
proper and legitimate object is that relationship 
of organism and environment in which 
functioning is most amply and effectively 
attained; or by which, in case of obstruction and 
consequent needed experimentation, its later 
eventual free course is most facilitated” (ibid., 
136). 
 
The function of cognition is to help overcome whatever 
obstacle arises in the ongoing flow of precognitive, 
practical activity (see also Blattner 2000, 232-34). Ideas 
are, similarly, to be regarded as what their functions are, 
namely, they are intentions to get practical organic 
activity back under way in some definite fashion, they 
are plans or rules for action. As Dewey puts it: “ideas are 
essentially intentions (plans and methods), and […] what 
they, as ideas, ultimately intend is prospecbve―certain 
changes in prior existing things” (1908b, 99). The 
purpose of knowing is to secure the undisturbed flow of 
practical life, and for that end, to assist the controlling of 
the environment. The truth or falsity of a particular idea 
or a unit of knowledge is to be determined according to 
its success or failure at fulfilling that function. A true idea 
is an operational one: one that works, one that is a 
solution to a problem, one that “corresponds,” that is, 
answers―like a key to the condifons set by a luck―to 
the functional demands. Success in solving that problem 
which gave rise to the idea of how to solve it, makes that 
idea warranted assertable, and in that sense true.  
As Ryder points it out in his volume, Dewey’s 
understanding of what counts as knowledge and truth is 
much more comprehensive than most approaches to 
that issue developed in more recent epistemologies, 
analytic or otherwise. The fact that cognition is treated 
by Dewey as a functional element of a general, creative 
process of evolving experience seems to be a conception 
broad enough for comprehending the whole spectrum of 
the various ways in which humans comport themselves 
to the world. Yet, there are less satisfactory aspects of 
Dewey’s approach, too, which may become explicit and 
especially pressing with regard to the question of the 
cognifve import of art―and Ryder does not fail to point 
them out. He enumerates two of the possible obstacles 
to “building into Dewey’s sense of logic the cognitive 
dimension of art” (2013, 7/15).3 The first is that for 
Dewey science remained the paradigmatic instance of 
knowledge, and even if he conceived scientific inquiry in 
broad, non-representational terms, “it is not clear,” 
Ryder writes, “that it can accommodate knowledge that 
results from query of the sort that characterizes the 
arts” (ibid.). Furthermore, insofar as Dewey equates true 
knowledge with warranted assertability, to that extent 
he tends to privilege knowledge in the form of 
propositional truth. But such a conception is “likely to be 
too restrictive to handle cognition in the arts, simply 
because the arts are not for the most part about 
assertions, warranted or otherwise” (Ryder, ibid.). 
 
In sum, although Dewey redefined the whole 
epistemological issue of cognition and, indeed, the very 
relation between humans and their environment in 
general in an anti-Cartesian and non-representationalist 
manner, namely, in terms of the factual practice of 
organic human life (rather than sheer thought), he 
nevertheless tended to think along the model of 
scientific inquiry and its propositional truth. And even if 
                                                 
3 I refer to Ryder’s volume by the formula: chapter 
number / page number within that chapter, for I have 
access only to a chapter by chapter division of the book.  
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he recognized the warrant of such a truth in its practical, 
operational, functional success, the enumerated doubts 
pertaining to these and similar issues are reasons good 
enough for exploring the ways and possibilities in which 
Dewey’s conception of experience and interaction may 
be improved. 
 
II.2. Buchler’s Theory of Judgment. An Attempt at 
Improving Dewey’s Theory of Experience  
 
With that purpose in mind, Ryder turns to Justus 
Buchler’s pertaining considerations, who was explicit on 
the point that Dewey’s tendency to think of knowledge 
in terms of inquiry was a major shortcoming of his 
conception of experience in general. Buchler developed 
his theory of judgment and his resulting concept of 
query as an attempt to correct just that Deweyan 
tendency and, indeed, the traditional view of knowledge 
prevailing in it, namely, knowledge understood as the 
result of inquiry. The aim of Buchler’s approach is to 
recognize and acknowledge the various ways in which 
humans interact with, and thereby may learn about, 
their environment. Whenever some kind of selection 
governs an interaction, a selection in the sense of “a 
more or less systematic organization or manipulation of 
complexes toward some end or […] result” (Ryder 2013, 
7/22), such an interaction is a judgment according to 
Buchler. Judgments, then, are purposeful orderings of 
the complexes that surround us, and they are classifiable 
in three basic groups: they are either assertive, or 
exhibitive, or else, active judgments.   
 
So called assertive judgments are generally propositional 
statements, and they are evaluable regarding their truth-
value. It is noteworthy that assertive judgments need 
not necessarily be linguistic (Ryder’s example here is a 
mathematical equation). And, of course, the sheer fact 
that an utterance is linguistic does not already render it 
asserfve―consider e.g. a linguisfc performance, a 
recitation, which is a case of exhibitive judgments. As 
such, it does not so much state something factually true 
or false, but rather reveals some novelty about its 
subject matter, as works of art generally do. The 
evaluation of exhibitive judgments differs from how we 
evaluate assertive judgments, namely, according to their 
(referential) truth-value. For an exhibitive judgment is 
rather suggestive and evocative, and it is evaluable “for 
example by the deeper understanding and appreciation 
it enables or by the expanded possibilities it reveals,” 
Ryder explains (ibid., 7/18). Finally, so called active 
judgments manipulate their surroundings by acting upon 
them, by doing something with them to some effect. A 
typical case of assertive judgments is a declarative 
sentence; that of exhibitive judgments is any work of art; 
and an activity of producing something or just doing 
something (not assertive or exhibitive) falls in the 
category of active judgments.4  
 
These categories of judgment are only ideally 
distinguishable in a clear cut manner, practically they 
often overlap one another. Nevertheless, all of them 
may yield some kind of knowledge: they may highlight, 
explore, or reveal in one way or other the complexes 
they are to judge. Furthermore, when judgments of any 
kind are developed in some methodic or systematic way, 
they become sharpened and interrogative procedures, 
that is, instances of query. Insofar as such interrogative 
procedures may yield real knowledge, the results of 
query of any of the enumerated kinds are to be regarded 
as of cognitive value. The obvious aim of Buchler’s 
theory of judgments and his concept of query, in which 
such a theory culminates, is to make room for a notion 
of cognition wider than that implied by scientific inquiry 
(which is a specific form of query, one properly to be 
associated with assertive judgment). Science, art, but 
                                                 
4 It may be of some interest to note that Buchler’s 
classification coincides to a remarkable extent with the 
pertaining division introduced by Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1927). Within the so called objectifications of life 
(Lebensauserungen) Dilthey differentiated between the 
following three groups: concepts, judgments, patterns of 
thought; acts or actions; and expressions of life-
experience (Erlebnisausdrücke). 
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also perfecfng of any kind of acfvity―all of these are 
forms of query for Buchler.  
 
The claim that knowledge results from such a 
comprehensive notion of query, which in turn is not 
exhaustible by any procedure of inquiry associated with 
assertive judgment or propositional truth, demands of 
course that the concept of truth be broad enough to 
cover non-propositional forms of truth. Ryder in fact 
develops a pluralistic notion of truth claiming that:  
 
“[…] truth itself has a multiple meaning […] In 
some cases […] truth is a matter of accurate 
depiction or reflection, in others it is a matter of 
insightful evocation, and in still others it has to 
do with having an impact on us. All of these and 
no doubt other senses of truth have in common 
the fact that they enable us to carry on, to move 
on to the next proposition, belief, insight, or 
experience” (ibid., 7/27).   
 
In order to broaden, accordingly, Dewey’s definition of 
truth as warranted assertability, Ryder introduces the 
notion of truth as “’warranted actionability,’ whatever 
its source and in whatever orders of our experience it is 
relevant” (ibid.). It must be stressed, furthermore, that 
the author emphasizes here the fact that “truth has 
something to do with the moving forward” and that it 
has a verbal sense such as depicting, enabling, 
engendering something, etc., rather than a static sense 
of reflecting some state of affairs (ibid., 7/26-7). It is 
especially this verbal sense of truth which I’d like to 
address below, comparing it with a similar notion in the 
context of hermeneutic philosophy (part IV.). Before 
that, however, I’ll try to position the two discussed non-
representationalist paradigms of thought in several 
different respects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Positioning Pragmatic Naturalism  
and Philosophical Hermeneutics 
 
III.1. Positioning Buchlerian Naturalism and 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics along  
the Issues of Scientific Inquiry and Art 
 
On this point it is quite a natural step to turn to that 
philosopher, namely, to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who 
devoted most of his energies to the philosophical 
justification of both the cognitive import of art and the 
scientific value and dignity of the humanities.5 On a 
point of his volume Ryder makes the following 
suggestion: “epistemology generally would do well to re-
examine its principles with the cognitive capacity of art 
in mind” (2013, 7/25). In fact, this is almost exactly the 
task we find carried out in Gadamer’s magnum opus, 
except that―for reasons to be explained later on―his 
investigation takes the form of ontology, rather than 
epistemology.6 If we now begin to compare the kind of 
Buchlerian pragmatist naturalism Ryder advocates with 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, we find the first 
important similarity, accordingly, in their very 
orientation. Namely, both of these philosophical 
approaches are motivated by the task of legitimizing 
forms of cognition beyond that implied by scientific 
inquiry.  
 
                                                 
5 The fact that Gadamer has been preoccupied by these 
themes is immediately reflected in the very titles of the 
first two (out of three) parts of his magnum opus: “Part I. 
The question of truth as it emerges in the experience of 
art,” and “Part II. The extension of the question of truth 
to understanding in the human sciences.”  
6 Ryder writes: “Imagine how differently naturalist 
epistemology might have developed had it begun with 
the […] reasonable assumption that because art results 
in understandings and insights that we have every 
reason to count as knowledge, we may therefore regard 
the knowledge generated by art as among the 
paradigmatic instances of knowledge. That this has not 
occurred is clear from the fact that one is hard pressed 
even to find the word ‘art’ in the indexes of major 
epistemological studies” (ibid., 7/24). Yet, in Gadamer’s 
case experience of art is the paradigmatic instance of 
knowledge drawn from any kind of non-methodical, 
hermeneutic experience. 
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Attacks on objectifying knowledge have been launched 
on the Continent most explicitly perhaps by Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Sartre. Husserl regarded objectivism as 
untenable within the phenomenological framework of 
the immanency of intentional consciousness, insofar as 
objectivism implies the “transcendent moment” of 
adequacy to a mind-independent reality and as such it is 
to be “bracketed” in the process of so called 
phenomenological reduction. In turn, Heidegger and 
Sartre criticized objectivism mainly as an escape from 
the existential concern for authenticity. In Truth and 
Method, however, Gadamer advocates a more relaxed 
posifon toward objecffying knowledge―similar to that 
reflected in Buchler’s theory of judgment―insofar as he 
defends the truth claim of hermeneutic query 
beyond―and not instead of―that acquired 
methodologically. This, then, is a second similarity 
between the discussed two positions. Gadamer, no less 
than the Buchlerian version of naturalism, does 
acknowledge a certain validity of scientific knowledge. 
What he refuses, though, is the sciences’ hegemonic 
claim that methodologically secured and in that sense 
objective knowledge would be the only, or even primary, 
form of truth. It is for that reason that in his magnum 
opus Gadamer aims at exploring the whole breadth of 
the so called “hermeneutic phenomenon” (namely, 
experience of art; experience of history―especially, but 
not exclusively―in the humanifes; and linguisfc world-
experience in general, also in its philosophical 
refinement), defends the peculiar truth claim of such 
kinds of hermeneutical experience, and highlights their 
role within the Bildung of individual and communal life.7  
                                                 
7 It is striking how similar the setting, the terms, and the 
description of the significance of the arts and the 
humanities offered by Ryder are: “Modernism has 
emphasized objectivity to such an extent that it has 
obscured the many respects in which people in fact do 
create our lives, our societies, and most importantly the 
respects in which our lives have meaning. This is done 
implicitly in daily life. More formally, it is done through 
the arts and the humanities, more than anywhere else. 
Literature, music, the visual arts, the performing arts, 
history, and even philosophy […] have one important 
Nevertheless, Buchler and Gadamer apparently conceive 
the defining characteristics of scientific inquiry in 
somewhat different terms, and this seems to inform to a 
considerable extent the rest of their theories. For 
Buchler, the peculiarity of science is that it utilizes the 
human capacity for producing assertive, propositionally 
fixed judgments. In turn, the peculiarity of science for 
Gadamer is that it aims at producing objectifying, de-
contextualized knowledge through methodological 
rigor.8 For Gadamer, the opposition between scientific 
and other kinds of cognition rests on the difference 
between practices that are methodologically secured 
and those interprefve ones which―for a number of 
reasons discussed below, the so called hermeneutic 
circularity being only one of them―escape 
methodology; whereas for Buchler the corresponding 
opposition between assertive and the other two kinds of 
                                                                       
trait in common. They all select aspects of their subject 
matter and relate them in new ways, whereby they 
generate, and reveal to an audience, new relationships, 
new meanings, and new experiences. These activities are 
all creative of our world precisely in that they bring to 
our attention ways of seeing and thinking that had not 
been available before. Furthermore, in doing so they are 
not simply revealing something that has all along been 
hidden, waiting to be discovered. On the contrary, they 
are creating new properties of the world, novel 
characteristics of the subjects they study and of the lives 
of those of us who interact with them, as either 
observers or participants” (2013, 5/11). 
8 For sake of clarity, it is advisable to differentiate 
between the possible meanings of the term “objective.” 
In its strongest sense “objective” refers to either the 
notion of reality-in-itself, or the ideal case of knowledge 
representing such reality-in-itself, apart from any 
subjective moment within such knowledge. In turn, 
objective knowledge in the Kantian sense pertains to the 
world of phenomena and obtains its objective 
validity―not so much from mind-independent reality, 
but rather―from the fact that each and every rafonal 
subject has the same a-historical a priori constitution of 
consciousness the proper use of which may produce 
knowledge valid for all. Today, however, when the 
notion of such an a-historic structure of consciousness, 
as well as the possibility of having access to reality as it is 
in itself, are mostly regarded as untenable, the term 
“objective” is for the most part taken in a more realistic 
sense, one that typically refers to results of scientific, 
methodically secured procedures (such as e.g. an 
experiment) designed to exclude subjective and other 
equivocal moments from the inquiry.   
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judgment rests on the difference between propositional 
and non-propositional embodiments of judgment, all of 
them being capable of methodical or systematical 
refinement.  
 
There are at least two important aspects to this 
apparent difference. The first is that according to 
Gadamer the assertive judgments typically produced in 
the sciences, and philosophy influenced by the sciences, 
feed on a nominalist grasp of language, namely, 
language utilized as a system of signs rather than 
approached as a speculative-mirroring medium of 
ontologically constitutive reality. Furthermore, 
methodology and nominalist utilization of language go 
hand in hand, insofar as methodical procedures aim 
precisely at excluding―beyond all the subjecfve 
factors―linguisfc equivocity inherent in non-
terminological language usage. To that extent, 
Gadamer’s distinction between methodological and 
hermeneutic practices seems also to imply or 
comprehend the Buchlerian distinction between 
assertive and other kinds of judgments: methodological 
practices aim at producing propositional truths, whereas 
hermeneutic practices may lead to some understanding 
which is expressible in non-propositional language, 
exhibitive artworks, or actions, which nevertheless 
reflect some truth. But Gadamer’s distinction does not 
only seem to comprehend Buchler’s insights in this 
respect, it seems to point beyond the laher―and that 
concerns the second aspect to be highlighted here.  
 
Namely, the human capacities for presenting forms of 
cognition beyond that implied by scientific inquiry are 
certain non-assertive types of judgment for Buchler, 
whereas it is understanding for Gadamer. Although 
there certainly are discernible overlaps between the two 
notions, of utmost importance here for us are the 
differences between them. In his sketch of the history of 
the concept of judgment Gadamer traces it back, first, to 
the humanist notion of sensus communis (not to be 
equated with Aristotle’s similarly termed concept 
developed in De Anima!), and in a second step, to the 
Greek notion of phronesis, the Aristotelian elaboration 
of which offers the very model for Gadamer in 
articulating his notion of understanding. All these are 
important here for two reasons. The first is that by 
means of such a genealogy Gadamer immediately 
situates the whole of his philosophical approach in the 
humanist tradition, and this is reflected in the fact that 
the “organ” of hermeneufc query―that which governs 
it―is not so much any systematic procedure, but rather, 
a “universal and common sense” (sensus communis). 
Such a “sense” is not a psychological talent, not 
something we may or may not have by nature. It is 
something one may acquire exclusively through Bildung 
(see the chapter on Bildung in Gadamer 2004, esp. 15-
17). Although such a sensus communis includes in itself 
the capacity of judgment, it points beyond the latter, 
insofar as it is a disciplined “sense” acquirable only in the 
process, and as a result, of having become gebildet. To 
that extent, there seems to be a tension on this point 
between Buchler’s and Gadamer’s views. For the 
methodic or systemafc sharpening of judgment―be it 
asserfve, exhibifve, or acfve―is part and parcel of 
Buchler’s notion of query. As opposed to that, the sensus 
communis governing hermeneutic practice cannot, by 
any means, be methodized, systematized, let alone 
being formalized.  
 
The fact that hermeneutic practice resists methodology is 
also underlined by another, even more decisive aspects, 
and that is the second lesson to be drawn here from 
Gadamer’s mentioned genealogy. This concerns the very 
nature and constitutive moments of understanding, the 
core concept in hermeneutics which refers to the elemental 
mode of our being open for whatever is. Nevertheless, I’ll 
address here several issues regarding the treatment of art in 
the presently discussed authors, primarily because it is the 
experience of art―as the paradigm case of hermeneufc 
experience in general―on which the peculiarifes of 
Gadamer’s ontological conception of understanding can 
most readily be demonstrated.  
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As mentioned earlier, Gadamer takes the cognitive 
significance and truth claim of art for granted, just like 
Buchler and Ryder do. He would probably subscribe to 
Buchler’s claim that art can most readily be associated 
with a kind of exhibitive judgment, too. For Gadamer’s 
central notion for describing “the mode of being of the 
work of art,” that is, what art “does” or is able to 
achieve, is Darstellung, and this concept implies 
“exhibiting” or “displaying,” as well as “presentation” 
(the term with which Darstellung is translated in the 
English edition of Truth and Method). This suggests, 
already on the level of terminology, a certain proximity 
of the pertaining views of these authors.  
 
Now, in Dewey’s notion of continuously evolving 
experience there seems to be no clear distinction 
between making an artifact and creating a work of art. In 
turn, Buchler’s theory of judgment does make room for 
such a distinction, insofar as creating artworks is a 
matter of exhibitive judgment, whereas making artifacts 
results from a form of active judgment. Nevertheless 
Gadamer, who in this regard follows the Greek 
distinction between techné and poiesis, not only draws 
the distinction between “making” and “creating,” but he 
does so by referring to a peculiar ontological process. 
For it is part of the essence of making or producing 
something that there is a plan (based on an idea of the 
product) available in advance, and the task is to realize 
it―which can be done repeatedly. As opposed to that, it 
is an essential characteristic of artistic creation that it 
cannot in a strict sense be reproduced. This fact points 
to an essential feature of works of art, namely, that 
every truly artistic creation is as much the outcome of an 
uncontrollable event, of a unique and unrepeatable 
event of “succeeding,” as it is the result of an effort on 
the artist’s part. With this, a notion of event constitutive 
in the creation of artworks comes to the fore.  
 
Furthermore, in a chapter of his volume titled “Making 
Sense of World Making: Creativity and Objectivity in 
Nature” Ryder makes the point that “creativity and 
objectivity […] stand in a symbiotic relation with each 
other. Objectivity provides the framework in which 
creativity occurs, and creativity is the developmental 
process of the world” (2013, 5/13). This amounts to 
conceiving the basic relation between nature and art in a 
very similar way as that emphasized by Gadamer. For in 
that respect, too, Gadamer follows ancient Greek 
insights according to which there is a sense of continuity 
between art and nature, namely, art having its place 
where nature left room for its further perfection. 
Gadamer underlines such continuity by maintaining that 
the form of motion which prevails in nature and the 
verbal sense of the “being” of artworks as they are 
experienced are the selfsame. Both of them take place in 
the form of play (Spiel), namely, as “self-presentation 
(Selbst-Darstellung) [which] is the true nature of play” 
(Gadamer 2004, 115). It is for that reason that nature 
has for long been regarded as the model for conceiving 
the essence of art:  
 
“[…] the being of the work of art is connected 
with the medial sense of play (Spiel: also, game 
and drama). Inasmuch as nature is without 
purpose and intention, just as it is without 
exertion, it is a constantly self-renewing play, 
and can therefore appear as a model for art.” 
“[…] self-presentation is a universal ontological 
characteristic of nature” (Gadamer 2004, 105, 
108, respectively). 
 
However, for Gadamer the mentioned continuity 
prevails not merely between art and nature, but indeed, 
between any mimetic representation and its “original,” 
what it represents. And such continuity is of primary 
importance for showing the cognitive dimension of art. 
For art is not to be regarded, as it became customary at 
least from Schiller onward, as a matter of “beautiful 
semblance,” that is, the opposite of reality. On the 
contrary: artistic presentation has an essential, 
ontologically constitutive relation to that what it 
exhibits. Gadamer shows that for example in the case of 
pictures which differ from sheer copies precisely in 
virtue of their standing in such an essential relation to 
their originals. But more generally, his point is that any 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
PO S I T I O N I N G  T H E  N O N -R E P R E S E N T A T I O N A L I S T  PA R A D I G M S  O F   
PR A G M A T I C  NA T U R A L I S M  A N D  PH I L O S O P H I C A L  HE R M E N E U T I C S   M i k l o s  N y i r o  
 
 
 98 
case of mimetic representation is not only an act of 
highlighting the essential features of that which is being 
mimetically presented, but such an act of highlighting is 
made possible by an emanation-like event that guides 
the process in which one tries to capture the original. 
Mimetic representation is that of the original―in the 
sense of both subjective and objective genitive, but with 
a greater emphasis on the laher―it is grounded in a 
prevailing ontological relation between the 
representation and what it represents:    
 
“The content of the picture itself is ontologically 
defined as an emanation of the original.” “The 
work of art is conceived as an event of being 
(Seinsvorgang) […] Its being related to the 
original is so far from lessening its ontological 
autonomy that, on the contrary, I had to speak 
[…] of an increase of being” (Gadamer 2004, 135, 
145, respectively).  
 
As we can see, the concept of Darstellung is an 
overarching notion for Gadamer, one that binds together 
the concepts of art, play (as well as the spectator, who 
“despite the distance […] still belongs to play”), but 
eventually also the concepts of word, and furthermore, 
speculative language, and Being (namely, the 
“speculative character of being” as “self-presentation,” 
where self-presentation “and being-understood belong 
together”―Gadamer 2004, 115, 427, respecfvely):   
 
“Obviously it is not peculiar to the work of art 
that it has its being in its presentation, nor is it a 
peculiarity of the being of history that it is to be 
understood in its significance. Self-presentation 
and being-understood belong together not only 
in that the one passes into the other […]; 
speculative language, distinguishing itself from 
itself, presenting itself, language that expresses 
meaning is not only art and history but 
everything insofar as it can be understood. The 
speculative character of being that is the ground 
of hermeneutics has the same universality as do 
reason and language” (Gadamer 2004, 427). 
 
What is important here for us is that Darstellung, 
especially in its primary sense of Selbst-Darstellung, is an 
utter ontological notion for Gadamer, one that refers to 
an anonymous process of the emanation-like self-
presentation of Being, a temporal fulfillment in which we 
are faced with, and our understanding may be 
enlightened by, whatever presents itself for us. What is 
primarily “exhibitive” in the context of philosophical 
hermeneutics is not merely one of the forms of human 
judgment, as it is the case in Buchlerian pragmatic 
naturalism, but rather, it is the achievement or 
fulfillment (Vollzug) of something supra-individual, and 
even―partly―supra-human.     
 
However, the most important question regarding such a 
result is perhaps this: How are we to make a somewhat 
clearer sense of such an opaque, for many even 
unintelligible, notion, namely, of something like a non-
human quasi-agency? It is this question that leads us, 
first, to the task of presenting a short genealogy of the 
discussed non-representationalist paradigms of thought; 
second, to an analyses of the two key notions of these 
paradigms; and third, to the discussion of a peculiar 
linguisfc phenomenon―the so called middle 
voice―which is to shed some light on the ontological 
notion of “event.”    
 
III.2. Overcoming Modern Subjectivism.  
A Genealogy of the Discussed  
Non-representationalist Paradigms of Thought 
 
In order to see more specifically the points on which the 
views of the discussed thinkers seem essentially to 
converge and/or diverge, I begin with sketching a short 
genealogy of their non-representationalist paradigms of 
thought. By the term “non-representationalism” I refer 
to philosophical approaches which conceive the relation 
between cognition and world in other than the 
representational terms of accurate mirroring or 
reflecting.9 In fact, many of the 19th and 20th centuries’ 
                                                 
9 It is worth of note, however, that such non-
representationalist approaches need not at the same 
time to deny or exclude the possibility that certain 
world-comportments of ours are able to represent in 
some sense our environing world. Yet, they certainly do 
not regard the cognitive acquisition of “objective” 
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main philosophical initiatives struggled with 
representationalist conceptions of knowledge, as well as 
with the formalism and self-referentiality inherent in the 
modern notion of subjectivity underlying them.10 The 
latter notion was introduced by Descartes’ cogito me 
cogitare (subject as a reflective, thinking substance), and 
it was retained also in Kant’s concept of a transcendental 
synthesis of apperception. Nevertheless, if the roots of 
representationalism are primarily to be associated with 
the rationalist and empiricist traditions, than the 
deepest roots of non-representationalism can be found, 
I would argue, in Kantian transcendental idealism. For 
according to the so called Copernican revolution 
“objectivity” is constituted, at least regarding all the 
aesthetic and rational elements of its form, by 
subjectivity; and the concomitant results are, on the one 
hand, that reason has only a regulative role in cognition, 
whereas its true constitutive role is to be found in 
guiding moral action, and on the other hand, that a basic 
distinction must be drawn between things-in-themselves 
and the way they appear for us, i.e. what is noumenal 
and what is phenomenal. These results amount to 
rendering untenable not only the classical notion of 
metaphysics―as an a priori discipline dealing with basic 
constituents of the mind-independent reality―but also 
the notion according to which what we can know only a 
posteriori, via rational representations of our empirical 
impressions about the things-in-themselves, is able 
adequately to mirror or reflect the things as they are in 
themselves.11 In short, the Kantian non-
                                                                       
representations of the world as the primary form of the 
relation between humans and their environment.  
10 In this regard, consider e.g. Kierkegaard, Marx, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Freud in the 19th 
century, and in turn, e.g. existentialism, versions of 
Marxism, (post-)structuralism, philosophical 
hermeneutics, deconstruction, and other French 
phenomenological approaches in  20th century 
Continental thought, and the entire tradition of 
American pragmatism and naturalism.  
11 It can be contested whether such phenomenal a 
posteriori representations still accurately reflect portions 
of  mind independent reality, or they are to be regarded 
as belonging entirely to an other order than that of mind 
representationalist impulse can be found in his idealist 
principle of the transcendental “identity of subject and 
object,” or else, his idealist constructivism, regarding 
cognition and knowledge.  
 
Such a (transcendental) idealism found its continuation 
on the Continent in various trends, among them the two 
traditions important here for us, namely, German 
Idealism, and Husserlian phenomenology of 
consciousness. The static, a-temporal formalism―but 
not the ultimate self-referenfality―inherent in Kanfan 
subjectivity has been overcome especially by Hegel’s 
notion of a historically unfolding spirit, and in particular 
his concept of self-consciousness relying on material 
work, and in turn, also by Husserl’s investigation into the 
temporal, process-like unfolding of the Kantian 
transcendental apperception, the process in which 
transcendental subjectivity constitutes pure 
consciousness through its intentional acts. Nevertheless, 
both of these approaches explored a temporal unfolding 
and self-consftufon of some kind of subjecfvity―be it 
an absolute, or a transcendental one, respectively.  
 
The classical pragmatists reached also back to Kantian 
transcendentalism, but also to Hegelian historicism. They 
recognized the importance of the nofon―of Hegelian 
origin―that the world-constitutive role of the subject 
should be extended to historically transformable 
categories instead of a-historical a priori structures of 
cognition. In that regard they referred primarily to 
human practices involved in ethically and politically 
structured networks of human needs and interests, and 
thereby they explicitly rejected the subject-centered 
conceptions of knowledge as mere reflection. This is the 
case in Dewey’s approach, too, in which Hegelian 
historicity and Darwinian naturalism merged with one 
another, issuing in his all-encompassing concept of a 
more or less continuous organic process of evolving 
                                                                       
independent reality. In any case, the Kantian Copernical 
turn points out basic difficulties in the idea of 
representationalism.   
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experience and nature, a process in which all kinds of 
tradifonal dualisms―such as subject and object, or 
nature and spirit, etc.―dissolve. In other words, non-
representationalism takes on a naturalist outlook 
modeled on the paradigm of organic life processes in 
Dewey’s case―one that has lihle to do with the 
mathematized concept of nature in modern 
sciences―and Buchler shares this naturalist impulse as 
we’ll soon see in more detail, even if in very different, 
non-biologistic, and much broader terms.  
 
Now, the affinity between these pragmatist traditions 
and Continental hermeneutic philosophies is largely due 
not only to their respective departure from modern 
Cartesian subjectivism, but also from the traditional 
Western emphasis on essences and substances. 
Pragmatism represents a “relational” way of thinking, 
one in which essence is being redefined and dissolved in 
terms of relations. On the Continent, Husserl’s work on 
intenfonality―the correlafon of consciousness and its 
cognized “objects,” i.e. the phenomena―has served as a 
decisive impetus for later developments toward a critical 
confrontation with, and ultimately temporalization of, 
classical substance-metaphysics. This was primarily 
achieved by Heidegger’s so called “destruction” of the 
traditional presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) ontology.  
 
Perhaps the chief novelty in the early Heidegger’s 
thinking is that he gave an ontological―and 
historicist―turn to Husserlian phenomenology. Being 
and Time carries out such an ontological turn by an 
investigation that aims at uncovering the meaning of the 
Being of enffes―and ulfmately the meaning of Being 
as such―, and also by the fact that it introduces 
“understanding” as the ontologically basic constitutive 
element of the very Being of human Dasein. That turn is 
a historicist one at the same time, inasmuch as 
Heidegger invests the notion of Being with a temporal, 
verbal sense, and also because understanding proves to 
be finite, always already historically-culturally 
determined, and event-like. The proper subject matter 
of such a phenomenological ontology is, then, the 
meaning of Being―always to be understood as the Being 
of something: of a certain kind of being, or the sum of 
beings―where Being is not itself an entity but “what 
shows itself in itself” (for us). Phenomenological 
ontology so conceived is “hermeneutic,” furthermore, 
because “what shows itself in itself” for us can only be 
approached under certain interpretative-hermeneutic 
conditions, due to our tendency to be preoccupied by 
beings, rather than by the meaning of their Being. The 
central idea here, then, is that Being is conceived as a 
phenomenal and temporal event of self-showing, as 
opposed to the notion of “Being” understood as the 
“existence” or presence of some substance or present-
at-hand entity. Heidegger captures this idea in his 
famous notion of “ontological difference.” In turn, it is 
this Heideggerian idea and that of his phenomenological-
hermeneufc ontology―but not his fundamental-
ontological quesfon of Being as such―that Gadamer 
follows in his elaborations of the mode of Being of art, or 
that of history, language, etc.  
 
As the sketched genealogy of the discussed non-
representationalist paradigms of thought shows, they 
derive from the idealist and historicist impulses of 
Classical German Philosophy, and divide into naturalist 
and non-naturalist–phenomenological branches, 
regarding which the pivotal points are the  pragmatist 
conceptions of nature and the Heideggerian concept of 
ontological difference. Now we turn to the exploration 
of these two issues, contrasting Heidegger’s basic 
concept primarily with the kind naturalism Buchler 
advocates, for the simple reason that the latter is much 
more broadly conceived than Dewey’s notion of nature, 
the latter being articulated solely in terms of organic 
human interactions.      
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III.3. Heidegger’s Idea of Ontological Difference  
and the Buchlerian Notion of Nature 
 
In this part I proceed by characterizing the central 
notions of these two thinkers one after the other, and 
having done so, by relating them along certain common 
and divergent aspects of them.  
 
Husserl’s attack on naturalistic philosophy rests on a 
notion of nature according to which it is but the sum of 
the causal relations between entities in space and time 
(Husserl 1965, 79-122). Naturalism so conceived is 
unacceptable for Husserl within philosophy, because 
philosophy as a rigorous science must concern itself with 
“evidences”―phenomenologically reduced, final 
intuifons of meaning―ahainable within the immanency 
of pure consciousness, and the basic feature of 
consciousness is intentionality. Intentionality and 
causality are the fundamental defining characteristics of 
two different domains of beings for Husserl, 
consciousness and nature, respectively, and it is the 
phenomenological investigation of the constitution of 
meaning in pure consciousness which is to ground any 
other sciences, among them the sciences of nature.  
 
In turn, Heidegger points to the fact that in drawing such 
a distinction between consciousness and nature Husserl 
relies on a traditional distinction, one that is not justified 
by phenomenological insight. Instead of relying on 
inherited concepts taken over uncritically, one must 
phenomenologically inquire into the peculiar meaning 
that the very Being of different domains of beings in 
each case has for us, that is, into the modes in which the 
fact that such regions of beings “are” is in each case 
meaningful for us. In such questioning, the Husserlian 
notions of consciousness and its intentionality are 
replaced by Heidegger with the rather ontological 
notions of Dasein and its constitutive self-transcendence 
(its “openness”). This way a path is opened for a 
phenomenological re-description of the ontological 
specificity―in the sense of the specific meaning of 
Being―of regions of beings referred to by tradifonal 
terms, such as nature, history, world, consciousness, 
ideal entities, etc.  
 
The important point here for us is that Heideggerian 
phenomenological ontology aims at uncovering―not the 
metaphysical traits or “categorical” determinants (let 
alone objective attributes) of different kinds or regions 
of beings, but rather―the meaning (which is strictly 
speaking an “existentiale” and not a category) that the 
Being of such kinds of beings in each case has for us. This 
means that notions like that of nature and naturalism 
can acquire a definite meaning only subsequently, which 
is to say, by means of a phenomenological investigation 
into the regional ontology of nature as such, but in turn, 
such an investigation must rely on and be guided by a 
fundamental-ontological query into the meaning of the 
mode of Being of nature―and such meaning is 
attainable, if at all, only as something that phenomenally 
“shows itself.”  
 
Usually the term “nature” is supposed to refer to a 
specific region of beings, one which is to be 
distinguished from “history,” or from “ideal beings” such 
as mathematical entities, etc. As opposed to that, those 
meanings which the Being of such regions of beings gain 
for us do not belong to any of these regions, because 
such meanings are not some kind of objectively or 
metaphysically determinable beings, but rather, they 
“appear as,” “show themselves as,” or “prove to be,” 
such and such, and they do so in the mode of 
phenomenal “self-givenness” within our relation to or 
comportment toward the beings in our world. For 
example, without prior―although for the most part 
implicit―understanding of what it means that there is 
such a thing as a tool, no making use of tools would be 
possible. Such meanings are understood―in a covered 
up manner, to be sure―prior to any explicit 
comportment toward beings. And such understanding is 
neither something “subjective,” nor something 
“objecfve”―it emerges within, and in virtue of, our 
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“understanding relation” (our basic mode of self-
transcendence) to beings, and meaning so understood 
emerges as something that “show itself” for us.   
 
The first and final kinds of “givenness” in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology, then, are the different 
meanings of different modes of Being of different kinds 
of entities, and they present themselves in each case as 
a phenomenal self-givenness (in the fashion of 
Husserlian “evidence,” but conceived in ontological 
terms, as something not reducible to the intentional acts 
of consciousness). The fact that such a self-givenness 
cannot be adequately described as belonging to some 
domains of beings, be it nature, consciousness, history, 
or whatever, is expressed by Heidegger’s famous notion 
of ontological difference. It prohibits that we equate the 
Being of anything with some being, and thereby it also 
prohibits that we regard the very phenomenal self-
showing of the Being of anything as some kind of being, 
be it natural, or otherwise.  
 
Thus, an “ontological event” of a phenomenal “self-
giving” of meaning (as it is expressed, e.g., in the 
German sentence “Es gibt Sein.”) is strictly speaking 
neither natural, nor supernatural. It is a mistake, e.g., to 
equate the Heideggerian notion of Being with some 
supreme being, such as God, or for that matter, nature. 
God or nature attain their own meaning of “Being for 
us,” which are to be distinguished from them as beings 
having such and such traits. The objective, or even 
metaphysical traits that are constitutive of beings are 
something other than what it means for us that there 
are such beings (and different regions of beings “are for 
us” in different senses). For example, a tool can have 
such and such traits, but the meaning of its Being―as 
Heidegger shows―is that it is “ready-to-hand” (1962, 
98); a mere extant object can be such and such, but the 
meaning of its Being for us is that it is “present-at-hand;” 
a human can be such and such, but the meaning of her 
or his Being is that she or he “exists” (both: 1962, 67). 
The Being of something is always the meaning we 
understand by understanding (not merely traits of that 
something, but) the very fact that it “is,” and thereby the 
particular meaning it “attains for us.” In turn, whenever 
such an understanding emerges it does so as an event. It 
is an event of emerging meaning. As the light makes first 
possible the visibility of any being, so it is the meaning 
implicit in a being’s “Being for us” that makes first 
possible the intelligibility of, and thereby our adequate 
mode of comportment toward, that being.   
 
Regarding Buchlerian naturalism we start with Ryder’s 
observation that in the American naturalist 
tradifon―and therefore also in the cases of Buchler and 
Dewey― “nature” “is broadly and richly enough 
conceived that there is no philosophical need to posit 
anything outside nature” (2013, 2/1). Here the 
conception of nature is broad enough not to exclude, 
but to comprehend even the notion of 
divine―whenever felt necessary―but only within the 
confines of some kind of naturalistic theology. 
Accordingly, the term nature refers here to “whatever 
there is,” with “no need to insist that this or any other 
word have only one meaning” (ibid., 2/3). It is not to be 
restricted to any specific regions of beings, be they 
physical or spiritual, real or ideal, found or made, 
encountered or fictional, and it is not to be equated with 
the sum total of such spheres of beings, either, insofar as 
the term nature does not refer here to a closed universe 
of beings. Furthermore, in Buchler’s case―but as we will 
see, not in that of Dewey―the concepfon of nature 
cannot adequately be circumscribed by referring to any 
specific means by which one may attain some kind of 
impression, conception, or knowledge in any sense, 
about nature, be it sensory perception, experience in the 
broadest possible sense, logical tenability, or whatever 
that may be. “Nature” for Buchlerians does not mean 
the field of scientific inquiry. It is not exhausted by the 
Husserlian notion of a causal order of spatio-temporal 
entities, either. It is not merely what is empirically given. 
It does not refer to the Kantian notion of phenomenal 
appearances or the laws regulating such appearances. It 
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is not merely what is experientially given. Nor is it a 
definite metaphysical entity. Nature is none of these, 
because it is all of these and even more.  
 
It is with good reason that so far we offered only 
negative delimitations of this term, namely, 
delimitations from restricting or limiting modes of 
conceiving nature. As Ryder also points it out, “no other 
definition is possible,” for the simple reason that “for the 
pragmatic naturalist nature does not serve as a category 
in any normal sense” (ibid., 2/4). One might object that it 
is a vague concept, then. Indeed, except that one is 
better off regarding it as a “heuristic” notion―and not in 
any sense a “representafonal” one―a nofon that 
primarily functions as “a general perspective or frame of 
mind […] prepared to try to understand whatever is 
encountered or invented as being among the complexes 
of nature. This is why Buchler […] ended up describing 
nature as simply ‘providingness’” (ibid., 2/4; Buchler’s 
term is from 1990b). The thrust of such a notion of 
nature in the American tradition of naturalism is that it 
promotes an inclusive, rather than exclusive, attitude 
toward every aspect of whatever is, and that it is also 
able to serve as the basis of a metaphysics, that of 
“natural complexes” in Buchler’s case (1990a), and of 
“experience and nature” in Dewey’s case (1958).   
 
Although the central notion of such metaphysics may at 
first seem to be vague, it nevertheless has contours, and 
the first and most important one of them is that it does 
exclude the idea of any kind of non-relationality, i. e. the 
very notion of ab-solute as (but not the concept of divine 
as such―see Ryder 2013, 6). One could even say that 
“naturalism” here means nothing other than this fact, 
namely, that whatever there is, it must consist to some 
degree and in some sense of relations, it must be 
“continuous with something else, i.e., […] there is 
nothing that is entirely other” (ibid., 2/4). In that sense 
nature is “all-inclusive.” Therefore, as long as one asks 
about the “what” implied in such a conception of nature, 
one fails to do justice to it. For it is “purposefully to leave 
open the full range of actualities and possibilities, 
realities and imaginings” (ibid., 2/3). The metaphysics of 
such a factually undefined notion of nature is not 
concerned with some encompassing “what” of 
“whatever there is.” Rather, it is concerned with the 
question of “how,” namely, how anything must 
necessarily be, provided that whatever there is, it must 
be natural, i.e. relational. It is for that reason that nature 
can be conceived in an un-exhaustible manner, in fact, it 
“is to be understood as pluralistic, which is to say that 
nature consists of whatever we find in it, and in 
experience, itself a fully natural process, without any 
need to reduce one kind of complex to another”  (ibid., 
7/1).  
 
What needs to be shortly mentioned on this point is that 
Dewey’s notion of nature is not entirely coextensive with 
that of Buchler. They fit together, however, and that is 
what Ryder advocates in his volume. Taking primarily 
Darwinian biology as the paradigm of his own 
metaphysics of experience and nature, Dewey made an 
effort to merge the two basic aspects of the interactions 
of humans with their environment, namely, the rather 
passive, encountering or “finding” part and the rather 
active, creative or “making” part. As a result, Dewey 
conceived a notion of experience in which the ongoing 
and changing organic interaction between the 
experiencer and the object of experience is itself 
constitutive of what is experienced. This way nature is 
defined in terms of experience, it is but the whole of the 
thoroughly dynamic and interactional dimension of 
experience for Dewey. In Buchler’s view, however, 
nature is a heuristic and open-ended metaphysical 
notion, something that reaches beyond all the 
conceivable dimensions of human experience. Dewey’s 
project of overcoming traditional dualisms in terms of 
human interactions with their environment, promising as 
it is, has in this respect a major disadvantage, namely, 
that it is over-ambitious in “reducing” nature to the 
experiential dimension. Buchler restores the right 
proportions here by emphasizing that it is not nature 
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that should be grasped in terms of experience, but vice 
versa, it is human experience that is to be understood in 
terms of “whatever is.” Human interaction with 
“whatever there is” is but a vanishing aspect of all that is 
or may be. Yet, the two approaches can be reconciled, 
and Ryder shows in detail, how. As he points out:   
 
“experience and the rest of nature are related to 
one another in such a way that the world can be 
understood as the interconnection of experience 
and the rest of nature without reducing either to 
the other. A relational ontology allows us to do 
precisely this by making it possible to say that 
complexes of nature are constitutive of 
experience, and that experience is constitutive of 
the complexes of nature to which it is related. 
Thus, the two are integrated without experience 
being defined away and without nature being 
inappropriately read through the prism of the 
human interaction within it” (2013, 2/5). 
 
The results of our survey so far regarding the Buchlerian 
notion of nature and the Heideggerian idea of 
ontological difference can be summed up, with some 
further observations, as follows. None of these notions 
are in any sense “representational;” none of them is a 
category; both refer to something that reaches beyond 
any and all regions of extant beings; and―perhaps most 
importantly―both imply something supra-human,  
regarding to which some sense of relationality is 
constitutive. Both notions break with traditional 
substance-metaphysics, although they differ in their 
attitudes toward metaphysics as such. The two notions 
differ, furthermore, in their understandings of the term 
“there is;” in their esteem of abstraction or 
formalization; in the terms in which they are respectively 
conceived; and in the kinds of relationality they 
maintain, among others.   
 
None of these notions are in any sense 
“representational.” Buchler’s notion of nature is such 
because it is not a category, but a heuristic and open-
ended metaphysical notion which includes, but also 
refers beyond, all the regions of extant beings; and 
furthermore, because―although what it names is, in 
fact, in some sense a metaphysical entity, but beyond 
that―it is the sum of the metaphysical conditions of 
“relational existence” as such, without factual 
restrictions, and regardless of the question whether such 
existence is actual or merely possible, as well. In turn, 
Heidegger’s notion of Being is not a category either, but 
an existenfale―which is to say that it has nothing to do 
with traits of objective or mind-independent reality, but 
rather, it refers to those basic meanings which different 
kinds of beings (among them human beings) have for us 
in virtue of their very Being, and by the same token, are 
constitutive of human existence by making possible our 
comportment toward such beings. Both notions refer to 
something, then, that reaches beyond any and all 
regions of extant beings. Buchler’s notion of nature 
includes, but also transcends the realm of whatever is 
extant. Heidegger’s notion of Being is of another order 
than that of extant beings, altogether. Furthermore, 
nature for Buchler, as opposed to Dewey, refers to 
something that reaches beyond all the conceivable 
dimensions of human experience, too, and in that sense 
it refers to something supra-human. In turn, Heidegger’s 
notion of Being refers to an event of self-showing that 
may become a “given” only to human understanding―it 
is a self-showing for us, to be sure―but nevertheless an 
event the fulfillment of which is beyond our control. To 
that extent, both notions imply something supra-human. 
 
Yet, Ryder’s point regarding Buchlerian metaphysics, 
namely, that it implies “nothing that is entirely other” 
(2013, 2/4), is also relevant in Heidegger’s case. Here we 
find one of the central commonalities between 
pragmatic naturalism and philosophical hermeneutics: 
both of them maintain a certain sense of relationality or 
contextualism, conceived in naturalistic and 
phenomenological-hermeneutic terms, respectively. 
Buchler’s notion of nature does away with every sense 
of absolute and the metaphysical concept of substance 
by replacing them with a notion of pan-relationalism. In 
turn, Heidegger’s notion of ontological difference calls 
attention to the fact that even if there is some absolute 
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being, the very fact that it “is” can reveal itself, or 
become disclosed, only for a being who is able to 
understand it―i.e., in their correlafon. And the same 
holds for the Being of substances. Regarding its Being, 
every kind of being is inevitably correlated to 
understanding it―understanding the fact that it is, and 
the meaning of the fact that it is. “Being” is a matter of 
being understood. In that sense, “Being” is not to be 
conceived as a substance―recall Heidegger’s prohibifve 
notion of ontological difference. 
 
However, beyond the fact that both central notions of 
the discussed philosophers depart from traditional 
substance-metaphysics, they differ in their stances or 
attitudes toward metaphysics in general. If the term 
metaphysics is to refer to all that which reaches beyond 
physics or “nature” (the latter understood here as a 
domain of extant beings), in that case both discussed 
notions, namely, nature and Being, are “metaphysical.” 
Yet, if one understands metaphysics as the discipline 
that aims at disclosing the ontological traits of mind-
independent reality, than Buchler’s notion of nature is 
an “affirmative metaphysical conception instead of a 
conception based on a supposedly necessary structure 
of knowing and experiencing” (Buchler 1990b, 269). In 
turn, the Heideggerian notion of ontological difference 
leads to an utterly non-metaphysical investigation into 
the quesfon of the Being of beings―and ulfmately to 
that of Being in general―one that is to open anew and 
revitalize such questions as questions, and to that extent 
it is designed to overcome any sense of a traditional, 
metaphysical notion of Being. Heidegger follows the 
Kantian, so called “anthropological turn” in doing 
philosophy. He raises the question of Being from a 
perspective prior to, one that precedes, that of 
metaphysics, namely, from the perspective of our finite, 
temporal, historical existence.  
 
Thus, Buchler’s enterprise can be characterized as a 
metaphysical relationalism, whereas that of Heidegger is 
a temporal-historicist contextualism. Is there a way to 
relate them in a more substantial fashion? Are there 
reasons for their specific manners of procedure, reasons 
we could assess in the light of one another? What I’d like 
to claim here is this: yes, there is at least one way to 
assess the scope, manner of procedure, and result, of 
these approaches, and it concerns several further 
interrelated issues, such as that of “existence” and 
“nonexistence,” abstraction versus facticity; creativity 
and freedom; and also the issue of temporality.  
 
Buchler’s approach comprehends―but it does so only in 
a certain sense―the kind of (historicist) contextualism 
Heidegger emphasizes. Within the frames of Buchlerian 
naturalism all kinds of temporal relafons―central as 
they are in Heidegger’s philosophy―are but specific 
kinds within the context of a network of other kinds of 
relations. In a similar fashion, concerning our “creative 
construction of meaning” Ryder writes: “[…] in our 
attribution of meaning to a specific event […] meaning 
[…] is one among the innumerable constituent 
complexes that taken together and in their specific 
relations are the event” (2013, 5/17). Buchlerian 
naturalism is conceived broadly enough to include any 
kind of relation or context, be it temporal, or whatever. 
But it is such in virtue of its procedure of abstraction and 
utter formalization, and that in turn is carried out at the 
expense of disregarding some issues, issues that are 
fundamental in philosophical hermeneutics.  
 
Buchler conceives “existence” in a certain opposition to 
traditional substance metaphysics, namely, in terms of 
relations. “To exist is to prevail in an order or orders, 
whatever they may be” (Ryder 2013, 2/8). Existence is 
“prevalence” for such naturalism, in whatever context, 
regardless of the differences between kinds of beings 
that can be said to exist or prevail. This is a generalized 
and formalized notion of existence, however, one that 
goes back to the scholastic distinction between 
existentia and essentia, and further of course, to the 
Aristotelian distinction between energeia [actualitas] 
and dynamis [potentialitas]. Therefore, even if Buchler 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
PO S I T I O N I N G  T H E  N O N -R E P R E S E N T A T I O N A L I S T  PA R A D I G M S  O F   
PR A G M A T I C  NA T U R A L I S M  A N D  PH I L O S O P H I C A L  HE R M E N E U T I C S   M i k l o s  N y i r o  
 
 
 106
does not ascribe existence to substances any more, but 
only to relations and to relations of relations, the very 
concept of existence he entertains is, nevertheless, but a 
continuation of the tradition of substance metaphysics, 
and it is something that remains unproblematic for him.  
 
This is a question Heidegger addresses explicitly, however, 
who offers a genealogy of the so called “metaphysics of 
presence” originating from the Greeks, and criticizes it on 
the basis of its inadequate understanding of Being, of 
conceiving Being as something present-at-hand 
(Vorhanden). As opposed to the latter, Heidegger’s notion 
of ontological difference emphasizes that different kinds of 
beings “are” in different senses, and therefore the senses in 
which they “are” cannot adequately be captured by one 
and the same concept, namely, “existence.” Accordingly, 
one of his basic distinctions concerns the difference 
between the modes in which Dasein “is,” and the modes in 
which beings unlike Dasein “are.” The reason for drawing 
that distinction is that “Dasein is an entity which does not 
just occur among other entities. Rather […] in its very Being, 
that Being is an issue for it” (Heidegger 1962, 32). For 
humans, the issue of their existence, of the fact that they 
are and have to be, is not something they could disregard, 
something they could possibly escape from―as long as they 
exist. Humans are “thrown into” their existence, and in 
existing they cannot but relate to, care about their own 
existence (Being)―in fact, they are not able not to care 
about it, even if they fail to care about it in their effort to 
escape from the task and weight of existing, in their 
“inauthentic” mode of Being. This elemental fact of “being 
involved in our own existence” explains why it is that 
Heidegger reserves the term “existence” for the mode of 
Being proper to (human) Dasein, whereas his terms “ready-
to-hand” and “present-at-hand” refer to the modes of Being 
proper to beings unlike Dasein, namely, tools and extant 
objects (these are the “same beings” regarded as ready-to-
hand within their pragmatic context of use, and in turn, as 
sheer present-at-hand entities looked at in a de-
contextualized manner, respectively).  
 
If Buchler’s approach is much more comprehensive in 
scope than that of Heidegger―who was solely 
preoccupied with the question of the meaning, truth, 
and topos of Being throughout his life―it is such in 
virtue of its procedure of abstraction and formalization, 
or―to put it otherwise―its uninvolved, de-
contextualizing, extrinsic, almost structuralist (although 
dynamic) spirit, of his vision conceived in terms of 
relations and locality, in a geometric temper, about 
whatever is or may be. These features stand in sharp 
contrast to Heidegger’s involved, contextualizing, 
immersed or intrinsic, historicist, existential and 
temporal manner of conceptualizing the facticity of 
human life and the meaning of Being as a quesfon―a 
contrast that is reflected also in their differing 
understandings of the term “there is.” Heidegger 
famously criticized almost our entire philosophical 
tradition for its theorizing tendency, and its varied 
metaphysics produced by such a “theoretical gaze.” As 
opposed to that, Buchlerian naturalism presents a 
theorizing-metaphysical esteem for an anonymous, 
dynamic, and entirely relational structure, of whatever 
is.  
 
How are we to approach such a contrast in an at least 
somewhat unbiased manner? We have examined one of 
Buchler’s concepts, “existence,” as it appears in the 
context of Heidegger’s philosophy. Now I propose to 
examine one of Heidegger’s central issues, namely, the 
aspect of temporality, as it appears in the context of 
Buchlerian naturalism. Our question is: How does the 
“temporal” figure in such naturalism, how does 
something new emerge within its pan-relationalism, and 
what is the place of creafvity―in parfcular human 
creativity―in it?  
 
Within the frames of Buchlerian naturalist metaphysics, 
whatever there is, it is defined in terms of relations. 
There is no absolute involved, no final atomic element, 
no substance. The constituents of such a pan-
relationalism are themselves constituted by relations. 
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One can talk about complexes, however―reminiscent to 
some extent of Leibnizien “aggregates”―the traits of 
which are defined by the relations in which they stand to 
one another, and the complex itself is defined by its 
relational locations. This view holds on every level of 
whatever is. Complexes can be viewed as themselves 
having traits, as orders locating traits, and again, as 
themselves being traits of other complexes. The idea is 
that everything is relational on every level, and the 
partition is a matter of relational location.12 In this vein, 
Buchler emphasizes the “natural definition” of the 
traits―traits of complexes, or again, complexes as traits 
of other complexes―where “definiteness” is due to the 
relational locations in which a trait stands. This way 
every constituent of “nature,” itself void of substances, 
is defined “by nature itself,” without recursion to 
essences, or anything other than locations within an 
open-ended pan-relational network. Since everything in 
such a network is defined “by nature itself,” Ryder calls 
the naturally defined traits and their network as 
“objectivity.”  
 
Furthermore, such a network of relational locations is 
not static, but dynamic. It is such due to the 
fact―presumably―that an open-ended network can 
never achieve the state of balance and static order. It is 
that dynamism which is the source of “creativity in 
nature.” It consists in the alteration of the relations that 
define a trait, a complex, or a complex as a trait. 
Creativity in this sense is a matter of relocation, entering 
new relations, taking on new traits, partaking in new 
orders.  
 
Alteration of relations and thereby of traits of natural 
complexes may as well occur due to humans. In that 
case humans become constituents of the complexes 
                                                 
12 “Location” is to be understood here as a metaphysical, 
as opposed to an empirical, concept. For example, one 
can justifiably talk about relational locations within 
semantic instances without recursion to an empirical 
notion of space, etc.   
they relate to, influencing the natural definition of the 
traits of those complexes. Humans themselves are part 
and parcel of nature so conceived, and their 
interventions into the orders of natural complexes do 
not introduce anything that is not possible by nature 
alone. Such an intervention is a matter of 
rearrangement, alteration, and not a matter of 
introducing something “entirely new” or “original.” The 
“birth” or the “perishing” of anything are merely matters 
of alteration of traits and relational orders with respect 
to the ordinal location of that specific something. Such 
alterations are examples of the emergence of relatively 
new prevailing relational locations, and in turn, of the 
relative “alescence” of previously prevailing relational 
orders. The notion of “nonexistence,” of “nothing,” can 
acquire no sensible meaning within such an open-ended 
network of relations. These notions qualify as non-
relational absolutes with no place in a pan-relationalism.  
 
The fact, however, that the traits of natural complexes 
are “naturally defined” by their respective ordinal 
locations, and to that extent they can be regarded as 
“objective” traits of nature, and furthermore, that 
humans and their interactions with natural complexes 
are conceived here as being part and parcel of nature so 
conceived, seems to imply a deflation or even 
elimination of the notion of subjective, human freedom. 
First, humans are said to be capable only to influence the 
natural definitions of traits of complexes, but not 
capable to originate such traits, if the latter is to mean 
the introduction of absolute new traits previously not 
related to any of the naturally defined traits in nature. 
Freedom as an unprecedented, originary act, qualifies 
again as an absolute with no place within the frames of a 
pan-relational metaphysics. Second, although the 
moment of human freedom seems to be recognizable in 
the acts of judgment we make, and judgments are 
selections according to Buchler, such selections seem 
nevertheless to be understood, again, as themselves 
ultimately being defined naturally. “Mathematical 
entities have the properties they do by virtue of natural 
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definition, as do dreams, hopes, and fictional characters” 
(Ryder 2013, 1/11). As complexes of naturally defined 
relations of nature, humans and their activities are 
themselves thoroughly and objectively defined 
relationally or naturally. Third, freedom might perhaps 
be considered as consisting in acts that are not 
contradictory to the dynamics of nature―reminiscent of 
Spinoza’s “solution” to the problem of freedom. But 
even in that case, the possibility of not acting in 
accordance with natural dynamics must be explained, 
and that seems to be implausible. Therefore, the 
objectivity of nature seems to comprehend all the 
moments of creativity, inasmuch as creativity is but the 
dynamic aspect of objectively defined natural 
complexes. Considered from the metaphysical 
perspective of Buchlerian naturalism, human freedom 
appears as an illusion―as Nietzsche has already pointed 
to that direction (2000, #19.)―an illusion stemming 
from the illusion of some notion of an ultimately 
substantive, non-relational agency. Buchlerian 
naturalism seems to give voice to a notion of “nature” 
which refers to an “anonymous dynamics,” namely, that 
of prevalence and alescence with respect to traits or 
ordinal locations of “natural” complexes.13  
 
One of the observations we can make here is that, for 
Buchlerians, the notion of nature comprehends the 
spatio-temporally defined order we usually call “nature,” 
as well as the historical dimension of human cultures, 
and all the possible others. The anonymous relational 
dynamics of Buchlerian nature includes as one among 
the other kinds of its orders the empirically understood 
                                                 
13 We might consider the fact, however, that even if 
ontologically speaking freedom is an illusion, it is 
nevertheless a meaningful illusion for most humans, and 
as such a meaningful instance it may be regarded as a 
constituent of semantic relations, a specific kind within 
the relational network of nature. But the same can be 
said about any of the meaningful human notions (among 
them those which have no place in Buchler’s 
metaphysics, such as “nonexistence,” absolute, 
substance, etc.). Here, however, I leave open this train 
of thought.  
spatio-temporal order of our environing “natural” world, 
just like the cultural-historical ones. One of the 
consequences of this fact, then, is that there is a 
continuity between nature and the human order, a 
continuity that is neither causal-mechanical, nor 
biologistic-evolutionary, nor any other in some specific 
sense, but a continuity of general, metaphysically 
conceivable structural analogy. This point gives 
metaphysical support to both Buchler’s 
claim―menfoned earlier in this paper―that art has a 
cognitive significance, as well as to the overall view of 
Buchlerians according to which every kind of judgment 
leads to some sense of knowledge.  
 
A further, for our purposes even more important 
observation is this: if Buchlerian naturalism seems to 
refer to a view about an anonymous dynamics of 
prevalence and alescence with respect to relational and 
ordinal locations, then spatiality and temporality figure 
here in a double sense. As we just emphasized, in their 
empirical sense the spatial and temporal relations are 
only specific dimensions among other kinds of relational 
dimensions of nature.14 The spatial as well as the 
temporal relations, when understood empirically, are 
comprehended here equally in terms of relational 
locations and their prevalence and alescence, no less 
than the a-spatial and a-temporal ones. The 
metaphysical notions of relationality, locality, and their 
dynamics, are all-comprehensive in Buchler’s view. It is 
on this level that spatiality and temporality reappear, 
already in a metaphysical sense. In their 
metaphysical―which is to say here, de-factualized, 
formalized―sense spafality and temporality surmount 
and govern, as final metaphysical conditions of the 
possibility of, the relational locality, and in turn, the 
dynamics of prevalence and alescence, of the traits of 
natural complexes. Without a formalized notion of space 
                                                 
14 One may wonder whether a typology of the factual 
kinds of relations, and thereby a certain ontology, could 
be developed within the frames of Buchler’s general and 
formalized relational metaphysics?   
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no relational locality is conceivable, and without a 
formalized notion of temporality no dynamics of 
prevalence and alescence are conceivable.  
 
  If we now want to relate this result to some aspect of 
the approach initiated by Heidegger, it is the following 
question that may yield some orientation for us: How, in 
what different manners, can spatio-temporal relations be 
conceived at all? In the next part of my paper I propose 
to examine a linguisfc phenomenon―the middle 
voice―in order to shed some light on the specific sense 
of “event” characteristic in Heideggerian-Gadamerian 
hermeneutic philosophy. I intend to do that as a 
preparafon for answering―only with respect to certain 
aspects, in the last part―the quesfon posed above, 
namely: Given the fact that Heidegger’s approach stands 
in sharp opposition to Buchler’s regarding the issue of 
traditionally conceived theorizing and also that of 
metaphysics, how are we to approach such a contrast in 
an at least somewhat unbiased manner? As I’ll try to 
show, this question is immediately connected to the 
question we just posed, namely: How, in what different 
manners, can spatio-temporal relations be conceived at 
all? In fact, the latter question proves to be the very core 
of the former one, as we shall see, or―to put it 
otherwise―the common ground for an unbiased 
comparison of the discussed approaches is to be looked 
for in their basic reliance on some understandings of 
spatio-temporal relations as such.  
 
IV. Truth and Event  
 
IV.1. Medial Events, Middle Voice  
and Philosophical Hermeneutics  
 
For reasons that will soon be clear, I will use the term 
“medial event” for referring to the Heideggerian-
Gadamerian notion of an anonymous process of self-
presentation “of Being.” I use the quotation marks here 
because the terms “self-presentation” and “Being” are 
coextensive, they are synonymous in the sense that it is 
the “Being” of the different beings that presents itself by 
itself, or conversely, whatever presents itself by itself is 
nothing else than the “Being” of beings, whatever kind.   
 
My central claim here regarding such medial events of 
“self-presentation” is that they are most properly 
expressible linguistically by the so called middle voice of 
verbs. For that reason, in what follows I’ll discuss this 
linguistic phenomenon as well as the philosophical 
significance of the notion of “event” inherent in it, a 
significance it acquires within the broad field of anti-
Cartesian attempts at overcoming modern subjectivism.  
 
The middle voice is primarily known from ancient Greek, 
because in most of the major occidental languages it is 
not expressible by a morphologically distinct form. (Yet, 
spoken Hungarian, for example, and other non-Indo-
European languages also have such a form.) Thus, our 
occidental linguistic development attests to the fact that 
the original function and meaning of the middle voice 
has characteristically been lost, and thinking in terms of 
activity and passivity has become predominant. Such a 
loss is clearly indicated by the fact that even standard 
introductions to ancient Greek grammar describe the 
middle voice as some mixture of the active and passive 
voices: as they explain, the middle voice “represents the 
subject as acting either upon himself (reflexive) or in his 
own interest” (Chase and Phillips, Harvard University, 
1961, 90), or else, it “is often used for actions which in 
some way affect the subject” (Wilding, Oxford, 1986, 
68). As it is conspicuous, in such characterizations the 
subject remains in the center of the action expressed by 
the verb: it is the subject who acts and at the same time 
is being acted upon.  
 
As opposed to that, the real significance of the middle 
voice is − when compared to the acfve and passive 
voices − that it gives voice to a third, autonomous 
meaning not reducible to any mixture of the meanings 
expressed by the active and passive voices. Such 
reduction is also invalidated by the claim − generally 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vo l .  6,  I ssu e 1 ,  2015 
PO S I T I O N I N G  T H E  N O N -R E P R E S E N T A T I O N A L I S T  PA R A D I G M S  O F   
PR A G M A T I C  NA T U R A L I S M  A N D  PH I L O S O P H I C A L  HE R M E N E U T I C S   M i k l o s  N y i r o  
 
 
 110
accepted among linguists − according to which the 
middle voice is more primordial than the passive voice 
(e.g. Cline 1983, v). This is also the view of the eminent 
expert of Indo-European languages, Emile Benveniste 
(1966, 145). He also offers a delineation of the function 
and meaning of middle voice according to which it brings 
to language an “action” of a “subject” standing in the 
medium of an event, whereby the subject is displaced, it 
gets out of the focus in favour of the event taking place.  
 
Benveniste’s main theses include the followings, among 
others.  
 
i) The distinction between the active and the passive 
voices, fundamental as it is in the verbal system of 
spoken occidental languages, is “inessential to the Indo-
European verbal system” (145).  
 
ii) The passive voice stems from the more ancient middle 
voice.  
 
iii) As the developmental history of Indo-European 
languages attests to it, the primordial verbal system 
consisted of two voices, namely, the active and the 
middle. This was, then, replaced by the triad of active-
middle-passive (“only for a given period in the history of 
Greek” [145]). Finally, the opposition between the active 
and passive voices replaced the former triad. 
 
iv) However, the usual categorization of the diatheses as 
well as the terms used for grasping them (active-middle-
passive) stem from the Greek grammarians, who gave 
expression only to a peculiarity of a certain stage of 
language. Therefore, the meanings and functions of the 
different diatheses, among them those of the middle 
voice, should be made accessible in a different, more 
original way.  
 
v) As Benveniste shows, the principle of a properly 
linguistic distinction between the two primordial voices, 
active and middle, turns on the relationship between 
subject and process (the subject is either external and 
therefore active, or internal and therefore middle, to the 
process).   
 
Several observations are apposite here concerning 
Benveniste’s claims. First, the Greek notion of mesotes 
should not be construed − in Benveniste’s manner − as 
“the middle” or “the transitional” between active and 
passive, but rather, it is to be understood as “the 
medial:” as that verb which brings to expression an 
“action” of a “subject” standing in the medium of a 
process or event. This suggests both that such an 
“action” is not a pure action, and that the middle voice is 
never purely passive. Second, the philosophical 
significance of Benveniste’s approach can be delineated 
in a preliminary manner by comparing the (primordial) 
active-medial opposition to the (occidental) active-
passive opposition. Within the active-medial opposition 
both voices express three aspects: the (temporal) event 
expressed by the verb; the subject of the event; and the 
locality (“spatiality”) of the subject with regard to the 
event. It is this latter aspect regarding to which the 
active and the medial differ from one another: the active 
is external, whereas the medial is internal to the event 
taking place. As opposed to that, within the frames of 
the active-passive opposition both voices express merely 
two aspects: the action (not any more an event!); and 
subjecfvity―and the difference between the two voices 
is whether the subject is the agent of the action, or it is 
the one being acted upon. This is a one-dimensional 
perspective (subject→acfon→subject), and in each case 
the subject stands in the focus. By such a transition two 
notions inherent in the middle voice, namely, the locality 
(“spatiality”) of the subject, as well as that “in which” it 
could be localized, namely, the notion of a pure event as 
such (as opposed to some “action”), get lost. As opposed 
to that, within the paradigm of the ancient active-medial 
opposition both diatheses are able to express in a single 
unit the threefold aspects of temporal event-“subject”-
its locality. 
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We may summarize the philosophical significance of the 
above considerations regarding middle voice as follows. 
The primordial opposition between active and middle 
voices represents a kind of thinking in terms of subject 
and verb. As opposed to that, the occidental opposition 
between active and passive voices represents the 
predominance of a kind of thinking in terms of subject 
and object. Therefore, the return to the ancient and 
mostly forgotten insight into mediality may indeed be 
one of those forms in which the philosophical fixation of 
such thinking in terms of subject and object, namely, the 
Cartesian subject-object dichotomy, can be overcome.  
 
In fact, my claim is―and this concerns the philosophical 
significance of the linguistic phenomenon of middle 
voice―that the hermeneufc philosophies of Heidegger 
and Gadamer are basically revitalizations of the ancient 
insight into mediality, investing it with a far reaching 
ontological significance. Both Heidegger’s Being and 
Time and Gadamer’s Truth and Method are queries into 
a single and unitary medial phenomenon: Dasein as in-
der-Welt-sein determined medially by the Seinsfrage, 
and in turn, the so called “hermeneutic phenomenon” 
with the paradigmatically medial notion of the 
fulfillment of Spiel as self-presentation in its center.  
 
Following the etymology of the term according to which 
it is derived from the Greek middle-voiced verb 
φαίνεσθαι, “to show itself,” a phenomenon―taken in 
the strictest phenomenological sense―becomes for 
Heidegger a pure “event of showing itself” (which is but 
a synonym of “Being”―Heidegger 1962, 51-55). What is 
to be emphasized is that this “showing itself in itself” is a 
pure medial event, a temporal occurrence and fulfillment 
(Vollzug) pure and simple. It makes no sense to talk 
about causes or agents behind such a self-showing, as if 
there would be something more to the mere process of 
“showing itself.” The “what” in the phrase “what shows 
itself” refers to nothing else but the unfolding of a 
medial event of self-showing. Therefore, the thematic 
field of phenomenological ontology is that of pure 
events of “showing itself” (called Being). Furthermore, 
since the question of Being can only become pressing for 
a being medially predisposed, Being an Time outlines the 
basic features of such a medial “sub-ject,” which is to 
say, it offers a medial anthropology in which human 
Dasein is exhibited as a “subject” constituted by a medial 
event (its very existence) at its core―an event into 
which it is thrown, towards which it is open, about which 
it cares (or, for that matter, fails to care).  
 
In turn, Gadamer’s central notions of play, fusion of 
horizons, conversation, and above all, the speculative 
Selbst-Darstellung of whatever is, are all instances of 
medial events. The fact that his notions are medial is 
made explicit by Gadamer only once, on the example of 
play:  
 
“[…] the primordial sense of playing is the medial 
one. Thus we say that something is ‘playing’ 
(spielt) somewhere or at some time, that 
something is going on (im Spiele ist) or that 
something is happening (sich abspielt).” “[…] if 
one starts from the medial sense of the word 
‘playing’ [it] clearly represents an order in which 
the to-and-fro motion of play follows of itself. It 
is part of play that the movement is not only 
without goal or purpose but also without effort. 
It happens, as it were, by itself” (Gadamer, 104, 
105, respectively).  
 
 
To that extent, there seems to be no question as to the fact 
that both Heidegger and Gadamer exemplify in a 
phenomenological-ontological manner what the middle 
voice means according to Benveniste.  
 
IV.2. Epistemological Consequences.  
Truth, Justification, Event, Interpretation  
 
We are in a better position now to highlight the 
presumably most basic affinities and differences 
between Buchlerian naturalism and Heideggerian (-
Gadamerian) ontological phenomenalism. The 
fundamental affinity between these approaches can be 
found in the fact that both Buchler and Heidegger rely 
on respective understandings of an ultimate sense of 
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spatio-temporal relations, understandings which in turn 
define their whole philosophy. It is a consequence of this 
basic fact that both of these approaches are concerned 
with something thoroughly relational, and therefore 
both refuse to make use of any sense of absolute, as well 
as of any form of classical substance metaphysics. 
Accordingly, both accomplish some form of overcoming 
modern subjectivism. Most importantly, both 
philosophers give up thinking in terms of activity and 
passivity, and both of them introduce something 
anonym and supra-human. There is a basic difference, 
however, in the very manner in which they conceive 
their specific notions of some ultimate and anonym 
spatio-temporal constellation. In doing so, Buchler only 
formalizes, but does not break with, the common sense 
view of space and time, a view that was predominant 
also in the metaphysical tradition of the West (at least 
from Aristoteles onward). As opposed to that, 
Heidegger―and in his footsteps, Gadamer―introduce 
into ontology a primordial, medial sense of spatio-
temporal relations.   
 
To put it otherwise, the two approaches are in some 
sense “externalist” (formalized-abstract-metaphysical) 
and “internalist” (factual-historicist-medial-
interpretative-anthropological), respectively. This 
difference has far reaching consequences regarding their 
respective understandings of the issues of agency, truth 
and justification, theory and practice, creativity, and the 
notion of event.  
 
1) One of the important consequences of this difference 
concerns the issue of agency. Although both stances 
break with the paradigm of thinking in terms of activity 
and passivity, they accomplish such a move in different 
ways and with different implications. Buchlerian 
naturalism seems to overcome modern subjectivism via 
dissolving the agency of human subjectivity in the 
dynamics and “creativity” of objective, naturally defined 
relational constellations. In that regard, Buchler moves 
in the same direction which many of the 19th and 20th 
centuries philosophical efforts took in their departure 
from the central role previously ascribed to Cartesian 
subjectivity. For in many cases they did so at the expense 
of giving up the notion of subject as a free and 
spontaneous agent (think especially of Nietzsche, or of 
Freudian sub- and unconscious, and again, the 
postmodern topos of the “death of subject”). Yet, to the 
extent that in Buchler’s case objectivity (i.e., that which 
is defined by nature and not by us) obtains its meaning 
in virtue of its contrast to―what would count as―the 
subjective, his break with the paradigm of thinking in 
terms of activity and passivity does not seem to imply an 
overall departure from the modern thinking in terms of 
the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. Buchler thinks 
in terms of objective relations. He dissolves agency and 
pafency by referring to such―altering, 
dynamic―relafons. As opposed to that, hermeneufc 
philosophy thinks medially, in terms of subject and verb 
(event). Such a thinking is not willing to pay the price of 
giving up the nofon of free―although historically 
condifoned―human agency, and in fact it offers a way 
of conceiving “subjectivity” in a non-Cartesian, medial 
manner, as a full-fledged agent who is sub-jected to, and 
is constituted by, events of self-revealing and 
enlightening meaning. Thus, while the Buchlerian project 
of conceiving the self in terms of objective dynamic 
relations, as well as the hermeneutic approach of 
understanding the subject in terms of medial ontology, 
equally stand in continuity with critiques of modern 
subjectivism, they differ in the important respect that 
the laher―as opposed to the former―is nevertheless 
able to maintain a sense of human freedom.   
 
2) In addition to Buchler’s objectivism, there is at least 
one more point on which traces of modernism are 
discernible in his endeavour. It concerns the issue of 
justification. Namely, Ryder makes the point that the 
Buchlerian metaphysics of natural complexes “cannot be 
justified by reason alone” (2013, 2/5). Buchler’s 
metaphysics definitely has something to do with the 
spirit of “more geometrico”―not so much in its phrasing 
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and its manner of textual expression, but rather in its 
degree of formalization and almost deductively relatable 
conceptual apparatus―and as a metaphysics it is an a 
priori, speculative achievement of human reason. 
Nevertheless, Ryder’s point echoes a more or less 
generally held view in the classical pragmatist tradition, 
namely, the view that any theory or unit of knowledge 
can be jusffied―and thereby regarded as true―only by 
virtue of its success in the process of its pragmatic 
valuation. An idea, theory, or whatever of cognitive 
import, is considered to be successful “if by putting it to 
work we are able to do things we are not able to do 
otherwise, and create relatively few new problems along 
the way” (Ryder 2013, 2/5-6). Truth must be practically 
enabling.  
 
There is a sense in which such a pragmatic view of truth 
and justification stands in continuity with the modern 
notion of theory, as opposed to that of the ancients 
which resurfaces―as we will see―in Gadamer’s case. 
For in sharp contrast to the ancient privileging of the 
theoretical way of life in which theorizing was but the 
highest form of practice, in modernity the relation 
between theory and praxis altered drastically, so that 
theory came to be regarded as for the most part 
independent of, and prior to, practice, and in turn, 
practice came to be understood to a considerable extent 
as the application of theory. As we can see, there is 
some kind of parallelism between that modern 
development and the point Ryder makes. If theory is in 
need of a posteriori, experiential, pragmatic justification, 
then theory and practice are regarded as distinct in 
some sense.  
 
As opposed to that, one of the basic features of 
hermeneutic philosophy is that it is concerned 
exclusively with that kind of knowledge which is not 
separable from being, or―to put it otherwise―with 
historically constituted, “embodied reason,” knowledge 
that is not a noetic construction but “historically real,” 
knowledge that is not abstract-“technical,” but rather, 
“practical-factual-existential” throughout. Regarding 
Heidegger’s notion of Being, e.g., the justification of this 
nofon is in each case a maher of―phenomenologically 
disciplined―“understanding-hermeneutic intuition,” and 
to that extent it is neither a metaphysical-“rational,” nor 
a pragmatic way of justification. Yet, such an 
understanding is simultaneously both an understanding 
of some meaning, and at the same time an enabling 
“capacity,” or better, a “potentiality-for-Being” 
(Seinkönnen―Heidegger 1962, 183), the basic 
“existentiale” that opens up possibilities of Being for 
human Dasein. As the basic constituent of our openness 
toward whatever is, understanding is strictly speaking 
neither a theoretical, nor a practical “capacity” of ours. It 
constitutes our very existence in the sense that we 
“are,” we exist as, understanding (or, for that matter, 
not-understanding) beings. The term “understanding” 
refers in hermeneutic philosophy to the very mode of 
carrying out our existence, and as such it is prior to the 
theory-praxis distinction. Any theory as well as any 
praxis stems from understanding. Although the 
pragmatist maxim according to which truth must be 
practically enabling is thereby fulfilled also by 
hermeneutic philosophy, it is achieved here without 
conceiving theory and praxis as distinct.  
 
3) Accordingly, the pragmatic claim according to which 
every cognition and every proposition is inevitably 
involved in some context of practical issues is echoed, all 
along, in hermeneutic philosophy as well. It is expressed 
in the basic hermeneutic notion of the so called 
hermeneutic circle, especially in one of its constituents, 
namely, the so called “fore-structure” of 
understanding―discovered by Heidegger, and adopted 
by Gadamer and their followers. Such a “fore-structure” 
or “pre-understanding” refers to the fact that 
understanding is always already conditioned by some 
previous understanding of the subject matter in 
question. Understanding begins by the “negative” 
experience of some disturbance, namely, by facing the 
fact that our expectations are being negated, something 
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else than what we have so far assumed seems to be the 
case. Thus, some prior understanding is the condition of 
the possibility of any event of understanding. 
Understanding is always already historically situated and 
motivated.  
 
In turn, whatever is understood, it is justified in the very 
event of understanding, and it remains such till it 
becomes negated by some new encounter. This way our 
always finite understanding is continuously being 
provoked, and it goes through a process of formation 
within the context of the historicity of human beings. To 
that extent, hermeneutics would wholly subscribe to the 
pragmatist claim made by Ryder, namely, that “our 
judgments are provisional and conditional, and […] they 
undergo ongoing ramification in experience and query” 
(2013, 7/25). But it could not agree with the Buchlerian 
reason offered for that, namely, that all this is “a 
reflection of the general relationality of nature” (ibid.). 
Hermeneutics could not agree with that last point simply 
because it is a metaphysical claim, one that is not in our 
finite and historically defined power to make, or at least, 
one that contradicts hermeneutic insights into the 
historically conditioned nature of every understanding. It 
is this that explains the “internalist” aspect of 
hermeneutic philosophy. 
 
4) According to hermeneutic philosophy, the arena of 
meaning formation is the context of the historicity of 
human beings. It is for this reason that the horizon-
forming powers of language and all kinds of tradition 
receive decisive importance in hermeneutics. This can be 
seen more specifically in Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. As we have seen, it is the Heideggerian 
insight into the ontological difference, and the project of 
phenomenological-hermeneutic ontology issuing from it, 
that Gadamer follows in his elaborations of the mode of 
Being of art, that of history, language, etc. Gadamer 
does not follow Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological 
question, however, the question aiming at the disclosure 
of the meaning of Being as such. This is not an arbitrary 
choice on the part of Gadamer, but rather, it follows 
consistently from his orientation and the results attained 
from such orientation. Namely, in working out the mode 
of Being and specific temporality of works of art, 
Gadamer recognizes in that mode a general “pattern,” 
the very pattern in which the historicity of humans is 
conceivable. It is the pattern of traditioning 
(Überlieferung) as such, the very manner in which the 
event of traditioning can take place and achieve its 
fulfillment. For human existence is ultimately historical, 
and it is such primarily in the sense that humans belong 
to, participate in, and thus, (their understandings) are 
constituted by, events of Überlieferung. In turn, such 
events are in each case an Überlieferung “of” some 
Sache (subject matter, issue, question, case).15 It is in 
that sense that our historicity consists in participating in 
handed down Sachen.  
 
Several points must be highlighted here. One of them is 
that by this move the notion of Sache takes center stage 
for Gadamer, in fact, it acquires the position and dignity 
which the notion of Being had for Heidegger. It is so 
because Heidegger’s leading question of Being is but one 
among an inexhaustible number of possible Sachen 
“waiting for” Überlieferung. Gadamer’s investigations 
concern the historical conditions of the possibility of 
Überlieferung as such, and in that sense they highlight 
the historicity or historical embeddedness of the very 
issue of Being, too.   
 
A further point is that Überlieferung takes place as a 
medial event, as the Überlieferung “of” some Sache. This 
genitive is to be understood as a simultaneously 
subjective and objective one, for the “subjectivity” of the 
human participants is no less constitutive in the event of 
Überlieferung than the very event in which the 
fulfillment of Überlieferung takes place. But even if this 
                                                 
15  The best discussion of the Gadamerian notion of “die 
Sache” can be found―in my view―in Nicholas Davey’s 
powerful volume on Gadamer’s hermeneutics (2006, 69-
91).  
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genitive is a simultaneously subjective and objective 
one, in virtue of the fact that such an event falls outside 
of human control, the emphasis falls on the objective 
side. Accordingly, when the hermeneutic approach 
highlights the fundamental mediality of the subject and 
conceives it in its medial involvement in whatever 
happens to it, such an approach corresponds to the fact 
that the Sache of understanding is always something 
that “befalls” the “subject.” But it is not any kind of 
Sache which can do so. The “subject” must be 
predisposed to the Sache that befalls it, it must have 
some kind of pre-understanding of it, and to that extent 
it must be involved in it, must belong to it, be sub-jected 
to it. Such a sub-ject is not any more an “exclusive 
subject,” then―not an agent acfng in a sovereign 
manner, not a purely spontaneous subject―it does not 
control and command the event, from outside, as it is 
the case with the active voice. Rather, the sub-ject of 
middle voice is a nonexclusive, participating one: a sub-
ject “actively” participating in an event which happens to 
it.  
 
Furthermore, Überlieferung is an utterly “communal,” 
and not an individual matter. Any Sache is that for a 
community of people, in fact, it is die Sachen which bind 
people together, above all. A Sache is something supra-
individual, then. It is something that is historically-
culturally constituted, something that owes its validity or 
“Being” for its being handed down. Thus, to the extent 
that a Sache “is” in virtue of the medial event of its 
Überlieferung, a moment of something supra-human 
and uncontrollable is also constitutive in its “Being”. For 
the same reason, it is utterly contingent, something that 
can easily loose its meaningfulness over time.  
 
In turn, our involvement in such supra-individually 
constituted Sachen takes the form of 
parfcipafon―parfcipafon in the event of 
Überleiferung, which is not an objectivization in any 
sense. That, in which one participates, is by no means 
something objective. For Gadamer, a hermeneutic-
interpretive query is a matter of acknowledging and 
ultimately under-standing the supra-individual 
meaningfulness and validity of some inherited Sache or 
subject matter.   
 
“Understanding is to be thought of less as a 
subjective act than as participating in an event of 
tradition, a process of transmission in which past 
and present are constantly mediated.” 
“Understanding is, essentially, a historically 
effected event.” “[…] being situated within an 
event of tradition, a process of handing down, is 
a prior condition of understanding” (2004, 291, 
299, 308, respectively).  
 
Thereby theory receives a new meaning for Gadamer, 
one that he draws from his analysis of the mode of Being 
of works of art, and that of historicity in general. As he 
shows, insofar as the spectator belongs to the play of 
art, his participation in such a play cannot be adequately 
conceived in terms of subjectivity. Yet, by devoting her 
full attention to what is being exhibited, the spectator 
accomplishes a “being outside of herself,” a kind of self-
forgetfulness, which in turn is due to its being present at, 
being wholly with (Dabeisein) that which is presented to 
her. It is constitutive of the role of spectator, 
furthermore, that she is “set at an absolute distance, a 
distance that precludes practical or goal-oriented 
participation,” and at the same time makes possible 
seeing the play as a whole, which is “a genuine and 
comprehensive participation in what is presented” 
(2004, 124). Such participation may fulfill itself in an 
event of truth: 
 
“A spectator’s ecstatic self-forgetfulness 
corresponds to his continuity with himself. 
Precisely that in which one loses oneself as a 
spectator demands that one grasp the continuity 
of meaning. For it is the truth of our own 
world— the religious and moral world in which 
we live— that is presented before us and in 
which we recognize ourselves” (ibid.).  
 
Based on this model of the spectator who participates in 
the meaning of what is being exhibited for her, Gadamer 
rehabilitates the notion of theory within the context of 
our historicity, our hermeneutic-interpretative world-
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comportment in general. As opposed to Heidegger’s 
hostility toward theory (which he closely associated with 
the traditional metaphysics of “present-at-hand” he 
resolutely criticized), Gadamer sticks to the temporal 
sense of Being emphasized by Heidegger, but at the 
same time he manages to conceive a corresponding non-
constructivist notion of theory, and thereby he 
reconciles the two. Theory is a peculiar form of cognition 
for Gadamer. It is not the grasp of methodologically 
secured objective instances of knowledge, not the grasp 
of discernible regularities and laws, it is not a know-how, 
either, not something detached from practical life. 
Theory is first and foremost participation for Gadamer, 
participation in the event of self-revealing meaning with 
respect to some supra-individual Sache.  
 
“But theoria is not to be conceived primarily as 
subjective conduct, as a self-determination of 
the subject, but in terms of what it is 
contemplating. Theoria is a true participation, 
not something active but something passive 
(pathos), namely being totally involved in and 
carried away by what one sees” (2004, 122).  
 
What is contemplated, namely, some Sache, is 
something temporal, as opposed to being substantive. 
What is understood in such contemplation, is 
simultaneously some meaningful aspect of the Sache, 
and our selves with respect to that Sache. Thus, theory 
in its specific sense is neither a tool, nor an act of the 
subject for Gadamer, but rather, it is a matter of 
participation in meaning-formation, and as such, it is the 
highest form of practice.  
 
5) As we can see, furthermore, “productivity” or 
“creativity” here is a matter of some supra-
individual―yet, simultaneously human and supra-
human―event. Although human acfvity is not 
contested in hermeneutics, the creative aspect of human 
interaction with the world is conceived as the result of 
such events of participating in some culturally formed, 
historically contingent and plastic, meaning. Thus, 
hermeneutic philosophy maintains that there is a 
“foundational relation” between the creative moment of 
meaning formation, on the one hand, and objectivity, on 
the other. Not because hermeneutics would defend a 
kind of idealism, which it does not―not with respect to 
the extantness of beings. On the contrary. Hermeneutics 
has a robust sense of “realism,” and it also upholds the 
unsurpassable and constitutive finitude of human 
understanding. Rather, the foundational relation 
between meaning formation and objectivity is due to the 
fact that―as hermeneufcs maintains―every meaning 
(even that of “objectivity,” which is the precondition of 
any claim about such objectivity) is something arrived at 
within the context of our historicity. The contrast with 
Buchlerian objectivism is decisive here: in hermeneutic 
philosophy, creativity emerges in the dimension of 
human historicity, whereas for Buchler it is a matter of 
objective nature.   
 
6) A related issue concerns the notion of “event” which 
appears in both discussed schools in close association 
with their respective concepts of truth. As opposed to 
certain trends in analytic philosophy which recognize 
only two kinds of “vocabularies,” namely, that of 
causality and that of intentionality, pragmatic naturalism 
has no difficulty with making a non-emphatic use of the 
term “event” in referring to whatever takes place in 
nature. But pragmatism maintains a more significant 
sense of this term as well―and Ryder doesn’t fail to call 
ahenfon to this fact, either (2013, 7/26)―a sense that 
immediately pertains to the issue of truth. As one of the 
relevant passages from William James puts it:  
 
“True ideas are those that we can assimilate, 
validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are 
those that we cannot. [...] The truth of an idea is 
not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth 
happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true 
by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: 
the process namely of its verifying itself, its very-
fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-
ation. […] The connexions and transitions come 
to us from point to point as being progressive, 
harmonious, satisfactory. This function of 
agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea’s 
verification” (1962, 194).  
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The sense in which the term “event” is attached here to 
the notion of truth, then, is that “truth happens” to a 
unit of knowledge insofar as it “proves to be”―or 
“doesn’t prove to be”―true in a process in which it is 
put to work. The notion of “event” is understood here in 
the manner of common sense, that is, as a process 
taking place in some practical context. Something is to 
be regarded as true if it is enabling and workable: 
“knowledge is a matter not of what we think but of what 
we can do in relation to our lived environment” (Ryder 
2013, 14-15).   
 
As opposed to that, the notion of event in hermeneutic 
philosophy, where it plays a decisive role, is primarily 
used in a rather transcendental, or better, medial 
sense―as an event of phenomenal self-showing of Being 
(which is “given” for an understanding intuition), the 
event of understanding, the event of fusion of horizons, 
or the event of self-presentation of a play, etc. In such 
contexts, the event is the mode in which truth and 
meaning is revealed and therefore is attainable for us, in 
its immediate and convincing evidence. It refers to the 
event-like character of truth-happening, either in the 
sense of a sudden and enlightening flash of meaning, or 
in the sense of a mimetic representation that reveals its 
subject matter “as it is, indeed,” in its truth. Neither of 
these senses have anything to do with something that 
would “verify itself” in a consecutive process in which it 
proves to be workable. Rather, they have to do with an 
event of “being revealed.”  
 
7) The final point I’d like to make pertains probably to 
one of the most important common features of 
pragmatist naturalism and hermeneutic philosophy, and 
it is something that John Ryder repeatedly pointed to in 
our conversations, and the present paper was trying to 
elaborate in some depth. It concerns the issue of 
interpretation. For despite the many differences 
between these two branches of non-representationalist 
paradigms of thought articulated in this paper, there is a 
pragmatically and hermeneutically equally important, 
even decisive, characteristic of them, one that may well 
be peculiar to these two philosophical attitudes. It is 
such precisely in virtue of some of their common and 
enumerated features, such as their thorough 
relationalism or contextualism and their concomitant 
departure from substance metaphysics; their critiques of 
modern subjectivism; the emphasis they put on human 
finitude and the practical embeddedness, conditioned 
and perspectival nature, of all human judgments and 
understandings; the fact that both make room for 
acknowledging productivity and creativity beyond 
whatever is objective in the sense of extantness; and 
that they do all these in such a way that none of them is 
advocating any notion of relativism in the nihilistic sense 
of “anything goes,” but maintain their respective notions 
of truth, as well as relaxed, non-combative, yet,  utterly 
critical attitude toward cognition and knowledge in 
general.  
 
The reason for the fact that these features are common 
to both approaches can perhaps be summarized as 
follows. Viewed hermeneutically, Buchlerian 
relafonalism is but a general formalizafon―and 
metaphysical extrapolation (with some losses, to be 
sure)―of the contextualism implied in the factual, 
hermeneutic-historical situation of all understanding and 
interpretation. Approached from the perspective of 
Buchlerian metaphysics, hermeneutics and its focusing 
on the historicity of meaning formation is but a 
parfcular dimension―with insufficient ahenfon paid to 
issues of objecfvity―of the universal relafonality of 
nature. Thus, the central issue here is the pan-
relationalism or pan-contextualism upheld by the two 
schools. The pan-relationalism of the Buchlerian 
metaphysics has been emphasized throughout this 
paper. The pan-contextualism of hermeneutic 
philosophy was perhaps less highlighted so far. Such a 
pan-contextualism is most explicit in one of the basic 
concepts of hermeneutic philosophy, namely, in the so 
called hermeneutic circle. Such circularity has been 
recognized throughout the history of hermeneutics 
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(Grondin 1994), and it was already part and parcel of 
ancient rhetoric. Taken in its most general, formalized 
sense the hermeneutic circle refers to the fact that the 
parts of a whole can be understood only by relating 
them to the whole, and vice versa, the whole can be 
understood only by referring to its parts. In philosophical 
hermeneutics, however, this notion of circularity takes 
on an ontological significance, and it comprehends now 
the whole breadth of the “hermeneutic phenomenon,” 
namely, our own fore-understanding of the Sache or 
subject matter in question, and the “voices” of 
contemporary and historic others addressing that Sache. 
Such a Sache is therefore something common to the 
parties of encounter, and it has a plastic and un-
exhaustible supra-individual meaningfulness over against 
any particular view entertained about it. In turn, any 
view held about a Sache proves to be “only” an 
interpretation, and even apparently opposing views may 
have their own particular truth with respect to the 
Sache, due to the particular context from which they 
approach it. This does not mean, however, that 
interpretations are arbitrary. Rather, the truth of 
interpretation is a matter of sorting out legitimate and 
un-legitimate pre-understandings with respect to the 
Sache. In this way the measure of every interpretation is 
the Sache selbst, and the truth of interpretations can be 
judged in the light of the many voices in which that 
Sache came to language.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“what constitutes the hermeneutical event 
proper […] consists in the coming into language 
of what has been said in the tradition: an event 
that is at once appropriation and interpretation. 
Thus here it really is true to say that this event is 
not our action upon the thing, but the act of the 
thing itself” (Gadamer 2004, 459).  
 
Something similar is true of Buchlerian relationalism, at 
least regarding the perspectival, aspectual nature, and 
the pluralism, of our legitimate descriptions of the 
world. If nature is thoroughly relational, and if “the 
creative construction of meaning is a moment […] of the 
creafve dimension of a relafonal, ordinal nature”―as 
Ryder says (2013, 5/18)―then meaning can be 
construed in as many ways and in as many respects as 
the un-exhaustible relational network that constitutes 
nature allows it to do. Here the plurality of legitimate 
interpretations corresponds to the multiplicity of nature.   
 
Regarding such permissive, but nevertheless critical 
spirit which characterizes both of these trends of 
thought, it can be considered as of secondary 
importance, after all, whether one conceives its 
ontological background in terms of nature, or in that of 
historicity.  
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